Original
श्रोतुः कर्तुं च सम्बन्धं वक्ता कं प्रतिपद्यताम् ।
पूर्वं दृष्टो हि यस्तेन तं श्रोतुर्न करोत्यसौ ॥ २२५७ ॥
यं करोति नवं सोऽपि न दृष्टप्रतिपादकः ।
घटादावपि तुल्यं चेन्न सामान्यप्रसिद्धितः ॥ २२५८ ॥
यद्यपि ज्ञातसामर्थ्या व्यक्तिः कर्तुं न शक्यते ।
क्रियते या न तस्याश्च शक्तिः कार्येऽवधारिता ॥ २२५९ ॥
तथाऽप्याकृतितः सिद्धा शक्तिरुच्चारणादिषु ।
तस्या न चादिमत्ताऽस्ति सम्बन्धस्त्वादिमांस्ततः ॥ २२६० ॥
यदि तस्यापि सामान्यं नित्यमभ्युपगम्यते ।
तथाऽप्यस्मन्मतं सिद्धं नतु द्व्याकारसम्भवः ॥ २२६१ ॥
शक्तिरेव हि सम्बन्धो भेदश्चास्या न दृश्यते ।
सा हि कार्यानुमेयत्वात्तद्भेदमनुवर्तते ॥ २२६२ ॥
अन्यथाऽनुपपत्त्या च शक्तिसद्भावकल्पनम् ।
नचैकयैव सिद्धेऽर्थे बह्वीनां कल्पनेष्यते ॥ २२६३ ॥śrotuḥ kartuṃ ca sambandhaṃ vaktā kaṃ pratipadyatām |
pūrvaṃ dṛṣṭo hi yastena taṃ śroturna karotyasau || 2257 ||
yaṃ karoti navaṃ so’pi na dṛṣṭapratipādakaḥ |
ghaṭādāvapi tulyaṃ cenna sāmānyaprasiddhitaḥ || 2258 ||
yadyapi jñātasāmarthyā vyaktiḥ kartuṃ na śakyate |
kriyate yā na tasyāśca śaktiḥ kārye’vadhāritā || 2259 ||
tathā’pyākṛtitaḥ siddhā śaktiruccāraṇādiṣu |
tasyā na cādimattā’sti sambandhastvādimāṃstataḥ || 2260 ||
yadi tasyāpi sāmānyaṃ nityamabhyupagamyate |
tathā’pyasmanmataṃ siddhaṃ natu dvyākārasambhavaḥ || 2261 ||
śaktireva hi sambandho bhedaścāsyā na dṛśyate |
sā hi kāryānumeyatvāttadbhedamanuvartate || 2262 ||
anyathā’nupapattyā ca śaktisadbhāvakalpanam |
nacaikayaiva siddhe’rthe bahvīnāṃ kalpaneṣyate || 2263 ||“For the purpose of setting up the connection for the benefit of the hearer,—which ‘connection’ could the speaker have recourse to?—The connection which he has perceived before,—that he cannot set up for the hearer; while the new one that he might set up has never been actually found to be expressive….. If it be argued that—‘the same arguments apply to the jar and such things also’,—then the answer is that it is not so; because in the case of these what is recognised is the ‘universal’, whose existence has been already established;—even as regards the ‘individual’ (jar), that individual which has been perceived to be efficient cannot be set up; while that individual which may be set up has not been found to be efficient in bringing about its effect.—Even with all this, however, in the case of utterances, the potency or efficiency has been recognised on the basis of the ‘configuration’ (i.e. the ‘universal’).—This ‘universal’ can have no beginning; but your ‘connection’ has beginning.—If, in connection with that (connection) also, you admit of an eternal ‘universal’ (commonalty),—then our view of the matter becomes established. But even so, there cannot be a dual form. as a matter of fact, the ‘connection’ is only a kind of potency; and of this no diversity is perceived; it is always inferred from its effects, and as such, it follows the diversity in the effects.—In fact the potency is always presumed on the basis of the fact of something well-known not being otherwise explicable; and when this purpose (of explaining) has been accomplished by the presumption of one potency, there can be no justification for assuming several—[Ślokavārtika-sambandhakṣepaparihāra, 22-29].—(2257-2263)
Kamalaśīla
The Mīmāṃsaka now takes up the view that ‘the Convention is made for each mortal being’ (the first alternative, under Text 2254); and points out the defect in it:—[see verses 2257-2263 above]
‘That he cannot set up for the Hearer’;—because it has perished (according to the Opponent).
‘Has never been found to be expressive’,—because it has never been perceived before.
‘In the case of the Jar and other things’.—By putting forward this incongruity, the Opponents mean to suggest the ‘Inconclusive’ character of the Mīmāṃsaka’s Reason. What is meant is that what has been urged is applicable to the case of the Jar, etc. also; for instance, the Jar that has been actually found to be efficient in accomplishing an effective action cannot be made again, because it perished as soon as produced; while the one that is made now has never been actually found to be efficient.
The answer to this is—‘It is not so; because in the case of these, etc. etc.’.—‘It is not so’ denies the Opponent’s assertion.—Why is it not so?—Because the ‘Universal’ has been established.
This same idea is further clarified—‘Even with regard to the Individual, etc. etc.’—Even though the individual Jar has had its efficiency perceived in the past in the fetching of water, yet that individual cannot be made again; as it has come and perished; while the one that is made now, its capacity for effective action has not yet been ascertained.—Even so, the capacity for effective action is taken for granted in all individuals, on the basis of the ‘Universal’ (Commonalty).
How so?
‘This can have no beginning.’—‘This’ stands for the ‘Universal In some places the reading is ‘na ca tasyādimattā, etc.’ the meaning of which is as follows:—Of the efficiency to bring about effects like water fetching and the like, there is no beginning in time; because the ‘universal’ is always eternal; and it is absolutely non-different from its substrata (in the shape of the Individuals); as declared in the words—‘The Universal has no existence apart from the Individual’.
Says the Opponent—‘The Connection (between Word and Meaning) also may be similarly regarded as eternal, on the basis of the Universal’.
The answer to this is that that cannot be right; this is what is explained in the words—‘But your connection has beginning’.
Further, if you admit of the eternal ‘Universal’ in the case of the Connection between the Word and its meaning,—in that case it becomes established that there is an entity that is eternal; and this is exactly our view.
It might be urged that that fact (of eternality) does not become established in connection with the Word, which is the matter under consideration.
The answer to that is—‘But even so, there cannot be a dual form’;—the ‘two forms’ consisting of the ‘Connection’ and the ‘Universal’; only one form is possible, not the Universal; because the ‘Universal’ subsists in several individuals; while the ‘Connection’ is one only.
Question:—How do you know that the Connection is one only?
Answer:—‘As a matter of fact, the Connection is only a kind of Potency, etc. etc.’—The ‘Connection’ is not anything different from the Potency.
Question:—What if that is so?
Answer:—‘And of this no diversity is perceived’.—‘Diversity’—plurality.
Question:—Why is it not perceived?
Answer:—‘It is always inferred from its effects’;—that is, in all cases, it can only be inferred from the eñects it produces; as declared in the words—‘Potencies of all things can be proved only by the fact of their effects not being otherwise explicable’,—It is for this reason that the Potency only follows the diversity of its effects; that is, when it gives rise to any notion of diversity regarding itself, it is only in accordance with the diversity of its effects; that is to say, on the ground that there can be no idea of diversity in the Potency unless there is diversity in its effects.—In the case in question, there is no diversity in the effect. Because the effect (in the case of the Words) consists only in the bringing about of the particular cognition; and this cognition could be based either upon the Word or upon the Object (denoted by it). There is no diversity in the former; because the Word is always recognised as the same. Nor can there be diversity in the cognition based upon the Object; because even when the word ‘Cow’ has been uttered hundreds of times, the cognition produced is never of any other kind (save that of the Cow).
The upshot of the whole is stated in the words—‘In fact, the Potency, etc. etc.’—It is because, the cognition of the meaning (denotation of the object, is not otherwise explicable that the Potency of the ‘Denoted and Denoter’ is presumed; and as this purpose is accomplished by a single Potency, the assumption of several Potencies is absolutely useless.
Nor can the diversity of the Potency be inferred on the basis of the fact of denotation not being otherwise explicable; all that this fact can indicate is mere Potency (not its diversity).—(2257-2263)