आगमे विश्वासटिप्पन्यः

Original

पर्यायादविरोधश्चेद्व्यापित्वादपि दृश्यताम् ।
दृष्टसिद्ध्यै हि यो धर्मः सर्वेषां सोऽभ्युपेयते ॥ २२२९ ॥

paryāyādavirodhaścedvyāpitvādapi dṛśyatām |
dṛṣṭasiddhyai hi yo dharmaḥ sarveṣāṃ so’bhyupeyate || 2229 ||

“If it be argued that—‘(In the case of Devadatta) the idea of his being one is not incompatible (with the fact of his being seen at several times), because there is succession (in the several cognitions of his presence)’,—then (in the case of word-sound also) please see that there is no incompatibility; also because the sound is all-pervading. in fact, the property that explains a perceptible fact may be accepted as belonging to all things.”—[Ślokavārtika—eternality of words, 200-201].—(2229)

Kamalaśīla

The following Text anticipates and answers the objection that the Corroborative Instance cited (of Devadatta) is not quite relevant:—[see verse 2229 above]

The argument of the Opponent is as follows:—‘The fact that, even though Devadatta is seen in different places and at different times, he is not regarded as several, what makes this not-incompatible is the fact that the repeated seeings of Devadatta occur in succession, one after the other, and not simultaneously; there is no such reason in the case of Sound. Hence there is difference between the case in dispute and the case cited as an example’.

In answer to this, the Mīmāṃsaka points out that in the case of Sound also there is a reason whereby there can he no incompatibility:—‘Please see, etc. etc.’—the construction is that ‘Please see that there is no incompatibility, because Sound is all-pervading’.

What the particle ‘api’, ‘also’, indicates is the reason mentioned before ‘because the articulations do not fill up the intervening space

Question:—Why do you accept the all-pervading character of the Word-Sound?

Answer:—‘In fact, the property, etc. etc.’—For the purpose of explaining the idea of the same Sound being heard at several places and times,—whatever property is found necessary is admitted through Presumption based upon the fact that a well-known fact cannot be otherwise explained; in the present instance, if the Sound did not possess all-pervadingness, its being heard at several places and times would not be possible; hence on the ground of this Presumption, Sound is regarded as eternal and all-pervading.—(2229)