Original
निष्प्रदेशोऽपि चात्मा नः कार्त्स्न्येन च विदन्नपि ।
शरीर एव गृह्णातीत्येवमुक्तिर्न दुष्यति ॥ २१९० ॥
बाधिर्यादिव्यवस्थानमेतेनैव च हेतुना ।
तदेवाभोग्यमन्यस्य धर्माधर्मावशीकृतम् ॥ २१९१ ॥
यथा तत्र भवन्नेव स्वामित्वादवरोपितः ।
न भोगं लभते तद्वद्बधिरोऽन्यत्र शृण्वति ॥ २१९२ ॥niṣpradeśo’pi cātmā naḥ kārtsnyena ca vidannapi |
śarīra eva gṛhṇātītyevamuktirna duṣyati || 2190 ||
bādhiryādivyavasthānametenaiva ca hetunā |
tadevābhogyamanyasya dharmādharmāvaśīkṛtam || 2191 ||
yathā tatra bhavanneva svāmitvādavaropitaḥ |
na bhogaṃ labhate tadvadbadhiro’nyatra śṛṇvati || 2192 ||“Even though, according to us, the soul is without parts and is conscious of all things everywhere, yet it actually apprehends the thing in the body only; and there can be nothing wrong in this explanation. [Ślokavārtika—eternality of words, 73-74.]—On the same grounds does deafness also become limited in scope; it does not form part of the experience of another soul, because it is influenced by merit and demerit (which varies with different souls).—Just as when the village-lord has been removed from the lordship, though continuing to live in the village, does not enjoy the privileges of the lordship,—so the soul of the deaf man deprived of the auditory organ in the body, though continuing to dwell in the body, does not enjoy the experience (of hearing sounds), which other men are hearing.”—[Ślokavārtika—eternality of words, 76-78].—(2190-2192)
Kamalaśīla
Says the Opponent—The Soul being all-pervading, the cognition of the Word-Sound in all places should be irresistible.
The Mīmāṃsaka’s answer to this is as follows:—[see verses 2190-2192 above]
What is meant is as follows:—
Though it is as stated, yet the actual cognition of Sound by the Soul appears only within the limits of the body with which it has been equipped by reason of its Merit and Demerit; hence the objection urged is not applicable.
Question:—The Soul being the same, how can there be such differentiation as cognition and non-cognition and embellishment and non-embellishment of the Auditory Organ?
Answer.—There is no force in this. Though Ākāśa is without parts yet, on account of the diversity of the objects with which it comes into contact, it becomes subject to distinctions as ‘ākāśa in the Jar’, ‘ākāśa in the Pot’ and so forth; the same would be the case in the matter under consideration also.
It is for this same reason that, though the Auditory Organ (as Ākāśa) is all-pervading and without parts, yet there are restrictions in the matter of Deafness, etc. on account of the diversity among objects with which the organ comes into contact.—This is what is meant by the words—‘On the same grounds, etc. etc.;’—the ‘grounds’ consist in the diversity among objects with which it comes into contact.
Question:—If the objects with which the Organ comes into contact are diverse,—even so, why is it that only a certain person becomes deaf?
Answer:—‘It does not form part of the experience, etc. etc.’—That same defective Auditory Organ does not form part of the experience of another person;—why?—because it is influenced by Merit and Demerit.
This same idea is further clarified by means of an example.—‘Just as, when the village-lord, etc. etc.’—The Lord of a certain village, even though continuing to live in the village,—if he is removed by the King from the Lordship,—does not enjoy the same privileges in the same village;—in the same manner, the deaf man does not hear the Sound, even though another man hears it.—(2190-2192)