आगमे विश्वासटिप्पन्यः

Original

घटादेरेकतापत्तौ जात्येष्टं सिद्धसाधनम् ।
व्यक्तीनामेकतापत्तिं कुर्याच्चेदनया दिशा ॥ २१३१ ॥
तथा दृष्टविरुद्धत्वं वाच्यं सर्वशब्दप्रमाणकम् ।
यतोऽध्यक्षादिभिर्मानैर्व्यक्तिभेदः सुनिश्चितः ॥ २१३२ ॥

ghaṭāderekatāpattau jātyeṣṭaṃ siddhasādhanam |
vyaktīnāmekatāpattiṃ kuryāccedanayā diśā || 2131 ||
tathā dṛṣṭaviruddhatvaṃ vācyaṃ sarvaśabdapramāṇakam |
yato’dhyakṣādibhirmānairvyaktibhedaḥ suniścitaḥ || 2132 ||

“If the one-ness of the jar, that is urged as an undesirable contingency, is in reference to the ‘universal aspect’,—then the argument is superfluous.—If however, one were to urge the contingency of the individual jars being one, on the strength of the above arguments,—then it can be pointed out that such an idea would be contrary to all forms of right cognition; because the multiplicity of individuals has been definitely established by all means of right cognition, sense-perception and the rest.”—(2131-2132)

Kamalaśīla

If it is in reference to the ‘Universal’—the ‘genius’, ‘Jar’—that one-ness is sought to be proved by the above Reductio ad, Absurdum, then, it is superfluous; as it has been declared—‘That aspect of the object which is Universal, Common, is eternal, the other aspect is held to be perishable’.

On the other hand, if the Reductio ad Absurdum is meant to prove the one-ness of the Individual Jars,—even so, that does not falsify our premisses. Because such a Proposition is directly annulled by Sense-perception and other Means of Cognition; specially as all the Reasons adduced in this connection have to be regarded as qualified by the condition that ‘what they assert is not annulled’; how then could there be any falsity in our Reasons?—Such is the sense of the passage.

‘Would be contrary, etc. etc.’—That is, the Proposition in question is so contrary.

The rest is easily understood.—(2131-2132)