आगमे विश्वासटिप्पन्यः

Original

बाह्यार्थप्रापणं यद्वा तत्सामर्थ्यं यदीष्यते ।
संवादित्वमसिद्धं तद्बहिरर्थापलापिनः ॥ २०५३ ॥
अर्थक्रियावसाये चेत्पत्यये हेतुतेष्यते ।
संवादित्वं तथाऽप्येतन्निरालम्बेऽपि शक्यते ॥ २०५४ ॥

bāhyārthaprāpaṇaṃ yadvā tatsāmarthyaṃ yadīṣyate |
saṃvāditvamasiddhaṃ tadbahirarthāpalāpinaḥ || 2053 ||
arthakriyāvasāye cetpatyaye hetuteṣyate |
saṃvāditvaṃ tathā’pyetannirālambe’pi śakyate || 2054 ||

(a) if by ‘being in conformity with reality’ it is meant, either that it presents the external object, or that it has the capacity for presenting it,—then this cannot be ‘admissible’ by the man who denies the external object.—(b) If, on the other hand, ‘being in conformity with reality’ consists in being the cause of a cognition envisaging effective action,—then, this is possible also when the cognition is without an external objective basis.—(2053-2054)

Kamalaśīla

(a) If ‘being in conformity with reality’ as the qualification of your Probans, means, either that it represents the external object, or that it has the capacity of representing it,—then, for the person who denies the external object—i.e. for one who holds that Idea or Cognition is all that exists,—such conformity can never be ‘admissible’; hence the Probans is one tainted with ‘inadmissibility’ by one of the two parties.

(b) If ‘conformity’ means that it brings about a Cognition which envisages the desired effective action—then,—so long as a proof setting aside the contrary conclusion has not been adduced, there would always be a suspicion of the Probans being present where the Probandum is absent; and this would make the Probans ‘Inconclusive Because such conformity would not be incompatible with the view that Cognition has no objective basis.—(2053-2054)

The following Texts show how there is no such incompatibility (with the Idealistic position):—[see verses 2055-2056 next]