1311 Verse 1999

Original

अनिर्भासं सनिर्भासमन्यनिर्भासमेव च ।
विजानाति नच ज्ञानं बाह्यमर्थं कथञ्चन ॥ १९९९ ॥

anirbhāsaṃ sanirbhāsamanyanirbhāsameva ca |
vijānāti naca jñānaṃ bāhyamarthaṃ kathañcana || 1999 ||

Either ‘not envisaging a form’, or ‘envisaging a form’, or ‘envisaging something else’,—the cognition cannot apprehend any external thing—(1999)

Kamalaśīla

Having thus proved that Idea alone exists, on the ground of there being no ‘object’, the Author now proceeds to prove the same, on the ground of the absence of the characters of the ‘apprehended’ and the ‘apprehender’:—[see verse 1999 above]

Neither as ‘formless’, nor as ‘with form’, nor ‘with the form of something other than the object’,—can there be any apprehension of the external Object; and there is no other way possible. Hence Cognition is always self-cognisant, even when there is another ‘Chain’ which is external to it. Hence it becomes established that Idea or Cognition alone exists.

Some people have regarded the Cognition of one form as apprehending (envisaging) a Cognition in another form; for example, the Cognition in the ‘yellow’ form apprehends also the ‘white’ conch-shell. This has been thus asserted by Kumārila [Ślokavārtika-nirālambanavāda, 108]—“In every case, there is an external back-ground, appearing under diverse conditions of Place and Time,—be it during this same life or in another life, or at some other time.”

It is in view of this view that the Text has introduced the third alternative.—(1999)