Original
स्वव्यापारबलेनैव प्रत्यक्षं जनयेद्यदि ।
न परामर्शविज्ञानं कथं तेऽध्यक्षगोचराः ॥ १९७३ ॥
क्षणिका इति भावाश्च निश्चीयन्ते प्रमाणतः ।
अणवस्त्विति गम्यन्ते कथं पीतसितादयः ॥ १९७४ ॥
सूक्ष्मप्रचयरूपं हि स्थूलत्वादाद्यचाक्षुषम् ।
पर्वतादिवदत्रापि समस्त्येसमस्त्वेषाऽनुमेति चेत् ॥ १९७५ ॥
स्थूलत्वं वस्तुधर्मो हि सिद्धं धर्मिद्वयेऽपि न ।
न ह्यस्त्यवयवी स्थूलो नाणवश्च तथाविधाः ॥ १९७६ ॥
अथ देशवितानेन स्थितरूपं तथोदितम् ।
तथाऽपि भ्रान्तविज्ञानभासिरूपेण संशयः ॥ १९७७ ॥
वैतथ्यात्स तथा नो चेद्व्यतिरेकेऽप्रसाधिते ।
तस्मादतिशयः कोऽस्य कार्यसंवादनं यदि ॥ १९७८ ॥
कार्यावभासिविज्ञानसंवादेऽपि ननूच्यते ।
सामर्थ्यनियमाद्धेतोः स च सम्भाव्यतेऽन्यथा ॥ १९७९ ॥svavyāpārabalenaiva pratyakṣaṃ janayedyadi |
na parāmarśavijñānaṃ kathaṃ te’dhyakṣagocarāḥ || 1973 ||
kṣaṇikā iti bhāvāśca niścīyante pramāṇataḥ |
aṇavastviti gamyante kathaṃ pītasitādayaḥ || 1974 ||
sūkṣmapracayarūpaṃ hi sthūlatvādādyacākṣuṣam |
parvatādivadatrāpi samastyesamastveṣā’numeti cet || 1975 ||
sthūlatvaṃ vastudharmo hi siddhaṃ dharmidvaye’pi na |
na hyastyavayavī sthūlo nāṇavaśca tathāvidhāḥ || 1976 ||
atha deśavitānena sthitarūpaṃ tathoditam |
tathā’pi bhrāntavijñānabhāsirūpeṇa saṃśayaḥ || 1977 ||
vaitathyātsa tathā no cedvyatireke’prasādhite |
tasmādatiśayaḥ ko’sya kāryasaṃvādanaṃ yadi || 1978 ||
kāryāvabhāsivijñānasaṃvāde’pi nanūcyate |
sāmarthyaniyamāddhetoḥ sa ca sambhāvyate’nyathā || 1979 ||If the perception, entirely by its own function, did not bring about the recognition (of the impartite atoms),—then, how could these be regarded as ‘amenable to perception’?—That things are momentary is ascertained by means of proofs; but how are the atoms cognised as ‘white’, ‘yellow’ and the rest?—It might be said that—“the first visible thing must be an aggregate of minute (invisible) things,—because it is gross,—like the hill and such things;—there is this inference (which proves our assertion)”.—The answer to this is that grossness is not admitted to be present in the two things; the composite is not gross, nor are the atoms so.—If what has been spoken of as such (gross) is the well-known form that is found extended in space,—even so, as such form appears in illusory cognition also, there would always be doubt.—If the answer be that—“illusory cognition is wrong, hence what is cognised is not admitted to be so”,—then the answer is that, unless a distinction is established, what would be the difference between this and that?—If it is compatibility with effective action,—and this is said to consist in compatibility with the cognition envisaging that effective action,—then such compatibility is possible. Otherwise also; on account of the capacity for action being restricted,—(1973-1979)
Kamalaśīla
What is meant by the emphasising particle ‘eva’, ‘entirely is the fact of there being no dependence upon the Inferential Indicative or the Reliable Word. What is meant is that, even though Perception comes about, it does so, in an unspecified (indeterminate) form; and yet that factor alone is regarded as ‘Perceived’ for practical purposes in regard to which it produces a Re-cognition of the form actually apprehended; while that factor with regard to which it does not produce this Re-cognition is as good as not-apprehended, even though it might be apprehended. Hence our Reason cannot be regarded as ‘inadmissible Specially because what is meant by the clause ‘Pratyayāprativedanāt’ (in Text 1968) is that ‘it does not figure in that cognition which is meant to be Perception, and which is put forward as the Reason in the Minor Premiss.’
It has been argued (in Text 1972) that—“the idea of grossness is a mental illusion”.—That is not right; because if the Atom, had been established by suitable proof, then alone could the idea of grossness be regarded as wrong or illusory;—as it is only when the momentary character of things has been established by suitable proof, that the idea of permanence is regarded as wrong. As a matter of fact however, the Atoms have not yet been established; as they form the subject of the present investigation.
Further, this ‘illusion of grossness’ cannot be said to be ‘mental’,—as it appears quite clearly; while what is confined to mere Conceptual Thought can never be clear; because the generic form is always indistinct; and without the generic form, there can be no Conceptual Thought.
The following might be urged:—“Like the non-eternality of things, Atoms also are actually established by suitable proofs. For instance, whatever is gross is only of the nature of the aggregate of minute things,—as for example, the Hill and other things;—and the first visually perceived object is gross;—hence this is a Reason based on the nature of things. The qualification ‘visually’ has been added for the purpose of excluding the ‘Atomic Diad’ (which is not visually perceived).”
The answer to this is as follows:—In the premiss ‘because it is gross’,—if it is real ‘grossness’, as a property of the thing, that is put forward as the Probans (Reason),—then such ‘grossness’ is not admitted by your disputant (the Buddhist) either in the Probandum or in the Corroborative Instance; and in that case the Probans is ‘inadmissible’ and the Corroborative Instance is ‘devoid of the Probandum’.
If, on the other hand, the ‘grossness’ meant is that which appears as extended in space, which cannot stand the test of investigation, and which is well-known to all common people, down to the veriest cowherd,—then, even in the ease of illusory cognition like Dream, such ‘gross form’ actually figures in Consciousness, even though there is no ‘aggregate of Atoms’ at the time; and hence your Probans becomes ‘Inconclusive’.
If, in order to avoid tins difficulty, you add the qualification ‘there being no illusion’,—then, so far as the Idealist is concerned, so long as the difference, between the visual cognition produced under normal conditions on the one hand and the cognition produced during dreams on the other, is not established,—there is no Cognition that can be accepted as being ‘free from illusion’; hence the qualification also becomes ‘inadmissible
The following might be urged:—“Between the normal healthy visual cognition and the Dream-cognition, the difference is quite clear—in that while the former is compatible with effective action, the latter is not”.
The answer to this is—What is this ‘compatibility with effective action?’—If it is the reaching of the external object,—then, that is not yet established; in fact, it is for the establishing of the external object that the Reason has been put forward.—If, on the? other hand, ‘compatibility with effective action’ be held to consist in the Cognition envisaging the desired effective action,—then, otherwise also,—i.e. even without the external object,—such compatibility would be possible; so that the Reason adduced is clearly ‘Inconclusive’.
Question:—“How would it be possible otherwise?”
Answer:—‘On account of the capacity for action being restricted,’;—i.e. because the capacity of the cause, consisting in the immediately preceding Cognition, is restricted; that is, a certain preceding Cognition is capable of bringing about only a particular Cognition; all are not able to produce all; for example, your own ‘External Object’; which also proves that there is restriction in the capacity of things.—(1973-1979)