1275 Verse 1923-1927

Original

न चापि शक्तिरूपेण तथा धीरवतिष्ठते ।
स्वरूपेणैव बुद्धीनां व्यवस्थानं तदा मतम् ॥ १९२३ ॥
सुप्तमूर्च्छाद्यवस्थासु चेतो नेति च ते कुतः ।
निश्चयो वेदनाभावादिति चेत्स कुतो गतः ॥ १९२४ ॥
यदीत्थं भवतस्तासु निश्चयः संप्रवर्त्तते ।
न वेद्मि चित्तमित्येवं सति सिद्धा सचित्तता ॥ १९२५ ॥
स्यान्मतं यदि विज्ञानं दशास्वास्वस्ति तत्कथम् ।
न स्मृतिः प्रतिबुद्धादेः तदाकारा भवेदिति ॥ १९२६ ॥
तदकारणमत्यर्थं पाटवादेरसम्भवात् ।
स्मरणं न प्रवर्त्तेत सद्योजातादिचित्तवत् ॥ १९२७ ॥

na cāpi śaktirūpeṇa tathā dhīravatiṣṭhate |
svarūpeṇaiva buddhīnāṃ vyavasthānaṃ tadā matam || 1923 ||
suptamūrcchādyavasthāsu ceto neti ca te kutaḥ |
niścayo vedanābhāvāditi cetsa kuto gataḥ || 1924 ||
yadītthaṃ bhavatastāsu niścayaḥ saṃpravarttate |
na vedmi cittamityevaṃ sati siddhā sacittatā || 1925 ||
syānmataṃ yadi vijñānaṃ daśāsvāsvasti tatkatham |
na smṛtiḥ pratibuddhādeḥ tadākārā bhavediti || 1926 ||
tadakāraṇamatyarthaṃ pāṭavāderasambhavāt |
smaraṇaṃ na pravartteta sadyojātādicittavat || 1927 ||

Consciousness is not present in the foetus merely in the form of a potency; the view held is that consciousnesses are present there in their actual form.—Whence do you derive the idea that there is no consciousness during sleep and swoon and such other conditions?—If it be argued that—“the idea is obtained from the absence of consciousness”,—then, the question is—how has this absence been cognised? In case your idea proceeds thus—“we do not cognise any consciousness at the time”,—then that itself proves the presence of consciousness at the time.—It might be argued that—“if consciousness is present during the said states, then why is there no remembrance of it on awakening, etc.?”—This fact (of non-remembrance) is not effective (in refuting our view); the absence of remembrance is due to the absence of vividness and other conditions (in the consciousness)—as in the case of the consciousness of the newborn infant.—(1923-1927)

Kamalaśīla

The following might be urged—“There is nothing incongruous in the idea of Consciousness existing there in the form of a latent potency, but the idea that it is actually there in its potent form is certainly incongruous”.

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verses 1923-1927 above]

There would certainly be an incongruity if there were some means of knowing with certainty that there is no Consciousness at all during the states of sleep, swoon and the like.

“There is this means of knowledge available in the fact that there is no consciousness or cognition of the Consciousness itself.”

That cannot be right; how has this absence of the Consciousness of itself been cognised? As ex hypothesi there can be no definite cognition of the absence of Cognition.

If also your definite Cognition proceeds in the form that—“in sleep, swoon and other states, I am not cognisant of any Consciousness”,—then this definite cognition itself proves the existence of Cognition (or Consciousness).

It might be argued that—“if there were Consciousness during sleep and other conditions, then why should not there be remembrance of it on awakening, etc.?’—The ‘etcetera?’ is meant to include the state when the swoon and the intoxication have passed off”.

But this non-remembrance is not effective in proving that what has been cognised did not exist there. It would be so if the mere cognition of a thing meant that there must be remembrance of it. As a matter of fact, however, in many cases, even when there is Cognition, there is no Remembrance,—on account of the absence of vividness, repetition and interest in the Cognition; just as is found to be the case of the new-born infant, where, even though there is Cognition, there is no Remembrance.—(1923-1927)