Original
अथ क्षणिकमेवेदं परैरप्यभिधीयते ।
कथं स्वोपगमस्तेषामेवं सति न बाध्यते ॥ १८८६ ॥atha kṣaṇikamevedaṃ parairapyabhidhīyate |
kathaṃ svopagamasteṣāmevaṃ sati na bādhyate || 1886 ||If the other party assert that “these elemental substances are momentary (not eternal)”,—then, in that case, why cannot their own doctrine be regarded as rejected by this?—(1886)
Kamalaśīla
If the four Major Elemental Substances are described by the other party as momentary,—with a, view to escape from the objections urged above,—then also, there are objections against him.—This is what is meant.
[These objections—against the view that Cognition proceeds from the elemental substances, Earth, etc.—are now set forth in detail.]
For instance, there is nothing to prove that between Cognition and the Body (made up of the material substances), there subsists the relation of Cause and Effect,—on the basis whereof the usage of the other party could be justified. This argument may be thus formulated:—When there is no evidence in support of a certain thing having a particular character, no sane man should treat that thing as being of that character;—for instance, one should not treat Fire as cold;—there is no evidence in support of t he presence of a causal relation between the Body and Cognition,—hence the wider proposition is not available.—Nor can the Reason be held to be ‘inadmissible Because the causal relation is always based upon Perception and Non-apprehension; and as such, it can be ascertained through particular positive or negative concomitance (Premiss),—not by mere perception or non-perception. When the fact of a certain thing being the effect of a particular cause is going to be ascertained through positive concomitance, what is to be found out is if the thing in question is one which is perceptible and which, being not seen before, is seen when the other thing (the Cause) is seen otherwise, if it were not found out if the thing is perceptible and was not seen before,—then it might be thought that the thing (Effect) might have been there even before the Cause appeared, or it might have gone to some other place. So that there would be nothing in the idea of the Tree and such other things, which have been existing before the cause in question, being the cause of the effect concerned. This possibility becomes averted by noting that the effect is one that could be perceived and is yet not perceived; as this condition is not fulfilled in the case of false causality. In this way the fact of a certain thi ng being the effect of a certain cause becomes ascertained through positive concomitance.—In the ascertainment of the fact of a certain thing being the effect of a certain cause through negative concomitance, it has to be found out what is that thing during the absence of which the effect in question does not appear, even though other efficient causes are there; otherwise, if all that were ascertained were that it does not appear when the other is absent, it would be doubtful if that particular cause is really efficient enough to bring about that effect; as other causes efficient for that purpose are also absent; so that it might be conceivable that—“these latter are the real causes of the effect; and it is the absence of these to which the absence is due; and as for its absence also during the absence of this other thing (which is intended to be the cause),—that may be a mere accident; just as in the case of the absence of date-palm, which grows in a place where the ‘Mātṛvivāha’ (?) generally grows, during the absence of this latter. Hence the qualification, ‘other efficient causes being present’, has to be added.—It is in this way that it is fully ascertained that the thing in question only can be the cause of the effect concerned; its absence being duly followed (by the absence of the effect). There is no such following of the absence of anything which renders no help in the bringing about of the effect; if it did, it would lead to absurdity.—Thus it is only through positive and negative concomitance that the relation of Cause and Effect can be ascertained, not in any other way.
There is no such positive or negative concomitance between the Body and the Cognition. For instance, there can be no certainty regarding the positive concomitance between one’s own Body and Cognition; because in the Foetus, before the appearance of the Cognition, the Body alone is not perceived; nor is it perceived apart from the Cognition. As regards the Body of another person also, the Cognition is not one that could be perceptible; and hence there is no perception of any order of sequence. Hence there can be no certain idea of positive concomitance.—Nor can there be any certainty regarding negative concomitance; it is possible to know that when one’s own body is absent, his own cognition also is absent,—because the man himself is absent; but it can by no means be ascertained that in the absence of another man’s body, his cognition also is absent. Because that man’s cognition not being perceptible, even on the absence of his body, there may be doubts regarding the absence of his cognition. It is for this reason that, even in the case of Trees, though the Body is not there, it is not certain that the Cognition is not there; as in this case also there will be the suspicion that its presence is not amenable to perception. It cannot be right to be certain of absence on the basis of the absence of vibration, etc., as it is not necessary that causes must necessarily produce their effects. It would be always a matter of doubt whether the absence of Cognition in the Tree is due to the absence of the Body or to the absence of its Cause in the shape of the absence of Desire which would be the cause of its having a particular body.
Thus the Reason adduced by us is not ‘inadmissible’.
Nor is it ‘contradictory’; as it is present in all cases where the Probandum is known to be present.
Nor again can it be ‘Inconclusive’; as that would lead to incongruities; and also it would mark the objector as being devoid of intelligence.
Question “What is there to prove that the contrary of the Proposition ‘The Body cannot be the cause of the Cognition’ is not true?”
Answer:—This has no force; as the proof is there; for instance, that ‘the Body cannot be the cause of the purely subjective Cognition’ is going to be proved under Text 1930—‘Mental Consciousness is independent, self-sufficient, etc. etc.’; specially as it is this subjective Consciousness itself which serves as the dominant cause in bringing about the contact of other bodies; which shows that it is not dependent upon the present body; and thus it is that the existence of the ‘other world’ becomes established.
Then again, the Body may be the Cause of the subjective Consciousness. But would it be so in the form of the single composite whole,—or in diverse forms, in the form of an aggregate of atoms?—Would it be the cause along with the sense-organs? Or without the sense-organs? Would it be the material (constituent) cause? Or the contributory cause?—These are the alternatives possible.
Now, the Body, as a single composite whole, cannot be the Cause of Cognition;—as the very idea of the ‘composite whole’ has been already rejected. And also because such an idea would militate against the notion that the cause consists of the Four Major Elemental Substances; as a single thing could not have four forms; as, if it did, then there would be an end of all notions of ‘plurality
Nor can the Body in the form of the aggregate of atoms be accepted (as the Cause of Cognition). Will the Cause consist of the Atoms severally or collectively? It cannot be severally; as in that case the Cognition would arise from each one of the atoms, just as the sprout arises from every one of the seeds. Nor could it be collectively; as in that case, the defect in anyone of the limbs—like the Nose for instance,—would lead to the contingency of no Cognition being produced at all; just as the defect in even one of the various ingredients of the Cause of the sprout,—in the shape of the soil, for instance,—makes it impossible for the sprout to appear. In fact, whenever an effect is dependent upon a concatenation of cause-conditions, it does not come about, when even one of those conditions is absent; if it did, it would not be dependent upon them.—It might be held that “all the atoms are the cause of Cognition, according as they happen to be in proximity”,—But in that case, there should be some difference between the effect as produced by a perfect cause and that produced by a defective cause; as the two causes would be different; otherwise the distinction in the cause would be pointless. As a matter of fact, when a cause that has been perfect in all its parts happens subsequently to be defective in certain parts, there is not found any difference in the subjective Cognition at all; and this is due to the fact that the impressions of past auditory and other cognitions continue intact,—It is only in the case of Animals, like the Elephant for instance, that there are changes in the subjective Consciousness, not in the case of human beings; the animals in the infantile stage of the body are dull, while those that have acquired a larger body are cleverer; the improvement and deterioration of the Cause, in this case, are found to bring about improvement and deterioration in the Effect; hence when, between two things, the changes in one do not lead to changes in the other, one cannot be the Effect of the other; otherwise there would be absurdity; and the changes in the Effect would be without cause.
Nor can the other alternative view be accepted, that the Body along with the Sense-organs is the cause of subjective Consciousness.—For, here also, would the subjective Consciousness proceed from each of the sense-organs severally? or from all of them collectively?—It could not proceed from each severally; because it is found that even after the disappearance of the Sense-organs one by one, the subjective Consciousness comes in all right. For instance, even when the motor-organs have become disabled by Paralysis and other diseases, the subjective Consciousness remains intact and enjoys a perfect state of existence. And when between two things, the changes in one do not bring about changes in the other, one cannot be the Effect of the other; otherwise there would be incongruities. Further, under the view under consideration, subjective Consciousness would have to be regarded as (a) apprehending only particular things, (b) as being free from conceptual content (indeterminate), (c) as being dependent upon the presence of the object,—just like the Visual and other sense-cognitions; because it would have the same cause as these latter; and also because there would be the possibility of several conceptions appearing at the same time.
Nor can the other alternative view be accepted,—that “Subjective Consciousness proceeds from all the sense-organs collectively”; as in that case, there could be no Subjective Consciousness, even when one of the Sense-organs would be absent (disabled); just like the absence of the Sprout on the absence of even one of its contributory causes.
Nor can the other alternative view be accepted—tha “Subjective Consciousness proceeds from the Body without the Sense-organs”, As under that view, it would be possible for the said Consciousness to proceed from the Hand and such other parts of the body even when severed from the Body. If it were held that a qualified Body is the cause,—then it would come to this that the cause consists of the Body as along with the Sense-organs; as no qualified Body can be shown other than the Body with the Sense-organs.
Nor again can the view be accepted—that “the Body is the material (constituent) cause of Subjective Consciousness”.—Because that particular cause is accepted as the ‘Material Cause’ of a certain Effect which is found to fulfil the two conditions—viz.: (1) that it helps, by its presence, the entire nature of the Effect embracing all its peculiar features, and (2) that the Effect undergoes no change except upon changes in the said Cause; as is found in the case where the Clay is held to be the ‘material cause’ of the Jar as it passes successively through all the modifications proceeding from the clod of clay to the finished product called ‘Jar’. It is for this reason that when one desires to modify a certain thing he modifies it by modifying its material cause,—not in any other way. When an antecedent Material Cause is there without having its potency impeded in any way,—no one can impede the appearance of the subsequent Effect going to be produced. For instance, in the case of the Jar, no modification can be made in the effect to be produced, without having brought about a ‘moment’ in the Clay incapable of further efficiency. In fact, in the bringing about of all modifications, the process is the same—that of producing of a ‘moment’ (entity) incapable of producing another ‘moment’; if it were not so, nothing could be directly contrary to anything. If such direct modification were possible, then, as the Cause, so the effect also could be modified directly by itself,—not through the bringing about of a like modification in its material cause.—It is true that in the case of the Lamp,—there is a modification brought about, in its outspreading light by putting up an intervening screen without modifying the Light at all; but in this case the Lamp is not the direct Material Cause of the Light; each Light-moment is the cause of the Light-moment that follows it; so that what happens is that the screen brings about a modification in the shape of a ‘moment’ devoid of further causal efficiency, and thereby practically destroys the Light at that, point.—In a case where a thing is modified without modifying an entity, it is not a case of Material Cause; when, for instance, the Oow is modified without modifying the Gavaya.—In the case in question, however, it is found that, without modifying the Body, the Subjective Consciousness is subjected, by wrong-doing, to modifications, such as evil intentions and the like. So that here there would be apprehension of something contrary to the wider premiss (that there can be no modification in the effect without modifications in the Cause;—if the Body were regarded as the Material Cause of Subjective Consciousness).
Objection:—“When there is modification in the Body, in the shape of being well-nourished and strong,—which is brought about by good food,—there is actually perceived a modification in the Subjective Consciousness, in the shape of Love and Hatred, etc.”
What does it matter if such modification is seen? This alone does not make our Reason inadmissible. For example, all that is meant by us is that, when between two things, the modification of one is possible without modification of the other, then the one cannot be the Material Cause of the other. It is quite possible that under certain circumstances, without any modification in the Body, there is modification in the Subjective Consciousness by wrong-doing. Consequently why should our Reason be ‘inadmissible’? But on the basis of occasional stray instances of modification (of the Subjective Consciousness due to modification in the Body) it cannot be right to regard the one as the Material Cause of the other. As, in this way, the object also might become the Material Cause (of Cognition). For instance, when one sees such disgusting things as the blood of the tiger, etc., there appears a modification in the mind of a cowardly person, in the shape of swoon and so forth; and yet this does not make the said Subjective Consciousness a material effect of that blood. Again, when the Mind is beset with vascillations due to love or grief and such causes, there come about certain modifications in the Body; and on the basis of this the Body might come to be regarded as having the Mind for its Material Cause. What is a fact is that when the modification of one thing always follows the modification of another, then alone can the one be rightly regarded as the Material Cause of the other. Modifications of the Mind in the shape of Love, Hate, etc. do not always follow from the strength and vigour of the Body; as it is not found to follow in the case of the vigorous man who has attained wisdom. Conversely, even a man or an animal with a weak body and poor development, who happens to have no opportunities for sexual and other indulgences, has his mind beset with much Love and Hate, etc. And when one thing comes about in the absence of another thing, one cannot be rightly regarded as the Cause of the other. If it were so regarded, there would be incongruities. Love and Hate, etc. do not proceed directly from the Body;—the absence of opportunities for sexual and other indulgences being the necessary intervening conditions. For instance, when the Body is quite vigorous, there is a pleasure felt in the contemplation of pleasurable sensations; in such cases, the man, who has a body and a soul and has his mind beset with the notion of impermanence attaching to Pleasures and their Means,—sometimes feels that what obstructs his pleasure does him good as well as harm; and thence follows the idea of the two alternatives of loving (the benefactor) and hating (the obstructor); thence follow (respectively) good-will and ill-will; from all this proceed the notions of Pleasure and other things.—All this is well-known through positive and negative concomitance. In fact, it is only when the Mind is happy and at peace that Love is found to appear; and it is often found not to appear when the Body is vigorous. From all tins it follows that vigorousness, etc. of the Body cannot be the cause of Subjective Consciousness.
From all this it also follows that, on account of its affording no direct help, the Body cannot be the Contributory Cause of Subjective Consciousness; because in the case of the Sprout, it has been found that the Contributory causes are only those that have a direct bearing upon it,—e.g. the Soil, Moisture, etc. If it were not so, there would be incongruities. Love and other feelings therefore must be regarded as proceeding from the awakening of an antecedent homogeneous seed. As for vigorousness of the Body, youth and so forth, these are found to give rise to Love, etc. by enlivening the impressions of the past, in men who have had no practice at meditation and are hence without the requisite wisdom.
Even granting that sometimes the Body has a direct bearing upon Subjective Consciousness, when this latter proceeds from its own material cause;—even so, it does not follow that it ceases upon the cessation of the Body. For instance, even on the cessation of Fire, the Jar does not cease to exist, because it has proceeded from its own material causes; so this does not affect our view adversely.—Nor is the Reason ‘Inconclusive’; for, if it were, then there would be incongruities.—Nor again is the Reason ‘Contradictory’, as it is present in all cases where the Probandum is known to be present.
Thus it is proved that the Body cannot be the Material Cause of Subjective Consciousness;—nor can it be the Contributory Cause;—from all which it follows that Subjective Consciousness proceeds from preceding cognitions one after the other occurring in the same ‘Chain’.
The following argument might be urged:—“When any two things are found to be invariably concomitant with one another (always found to exist together), they must be regarded as Material Cause and Effect; as in the case of the Lamp and the Light; there is such invariable concomitance between the Body and the Subjective Consciousness;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things”.
The Reason adduced here is ‘inadmissible’ for one or the other party. Because in certain eases, where the Mind-essence is devoid of material form, Subjective Consciousness is present even though there is no body.—Nor does the argument put forward quite prove what is meant to be proved; as on the same grounds Subjective Consciousness might be regarded as the Material Cause of the Body.
The Reason adduced is ‘Inconclusive’ also; as the said concomitance is possible even when the cause is different; as between Fire and fluidity of (melted) Copper. For instance, it is only with Fire as the contributory cause, that Copper produces Fluidity,—not otherwise; similarly, in the case in question, the Foetus, which is the material cause of the Body, produces the next body, which is the contributory cause of Subjective Consciousness; so that the concomitance between the Body and the Subjective Consciousness is not due to the one being the material cause of the other;—to tins extent, the Reason adduced is ‘Inconclusive’, ‘Doubtful
The following might be urged;—“Even though the Subjective Consciousness appearing subsequently proceeds from each proceeding Consciousness (cognition),—yet that which appears for the first time must have proceeded from the Body; hence it cannot be regarded as beginningless”.
This is not right. There is no proof in support of such an assumption,—as has been explained already.—It cannot be said that “there is no proof to the contrary either”;—because there certainly is proof to the contrary. For instance, if the Mental Cognition (Subjective Consciousness) were once at the outset produced out of the Body and then subsequently came to be produced out of each preceding homogeneous Cognition,—then for ever afterwards it would be produced out of preceding homogeneous cognitions,—and never out of heterogeneous cognitions produced through the Eye and other organs; when once the Smoke has been produced by Fire, it is never, later on, produced from anything not homogeneous to itself. As a matter of fact, Mental Cognition is not always found to be produced by Mental Cognitions only; it is found to be produced by any Cognition that happens to go immediately before it;—when one thing has been found to appear immediately, after another thing, the former cannot be held to proceed from anything other than the latter; as in that case, it would have to be regarded as being without cause. As regards Mental Cognition, it is found to appear immediately after the visual and other cognitions; hence it becomes established that it can follow from any Cognition without restriction.
Further, if it is only at the earlier stage that the Body is the material cause of the Mental Cognition,—and not at the later stages,—then why should it not proceed entirely independently of the Body? It is not right that it should depend upon the Body which does not help it in any way.—It might be urged—“In your case also, where one cognition is preceded and brought about by another cognition, why should not the Cognition proceed by itself alone?”—There can be no force in. this, as it does so proceed; as in the case where the Mind-element is without material embodiment; when a Cognition wants another Cognition, it is dependent upon that; this is only natural and should not be objected to.—If it is held that “at the later stages also the Body does help the mental Cognition”,—then there would be the incongruity of several chains of Cognition proceeding at once; as the Body which is the Material Cause of the other Cognition would be present there in its efficient form and would be productive of the same. Because whichever Cognition is produced from the Body sets going its own ‘chain of cognitions’ which is different from the other Chains; in this way therefore for a single person there would be issuing forth, at every moment, innumerable ‘Chains of Cognition’, But such is never found to be the case.
It might be argued that—“when the Body helps the Cognition at the later stages, it does not help as its Material Cause; it is only as a Contributory Cause that it helps the Mental Cognition that has been produced out of itself as the Material Cause, in bringing about each of its succeeding effects; so that the Body helps as a contributory cause, and the Cognition does not function entirely independently of the Body at any stage.”
This also cannot be true. When one thing is known to be productive of another thing in a certain way, it cannot produce it in any other way; as there is no difference in the conditions. For instance, the Light, having served as productive of visual Cognition as its basis, does not produce it in another way; as has been thus declared—‘Apart from apprehensibility, there is no other characteristic of the apprehensible thing; Colour and other things cannot otherwise be helpful to the Cognition’.—If it were not so, there could be no certainty regarding the difference and non-difference of the Effect from the character brought about by its Cause; as it would not be following in the wake of the help rendered by it; and this would mean that the Effect is without a Cause.
Then again, at the first stage,—apart from the Body being directly productive of the Cognition,—you have not noticed in it any other character of the Material Cause. What you have apprehended is merely the fact of its being a directly contributory cause. And as this is present at the later stages also,—why should it not be the Material Cause at those stages also? Otherwise, as at the later stages, so at the first stage also, it may not be the Material Cause at all; as the conditions are the same.
It will not be right to argue that—“At the later stages also, it is the Body itself which, along with the preceding Cognition, would be the Material Cause of each succeeding Cognition—Because the possibility of its being such a Material Cause has been already rejected in detail; and also because in that case, the first initial Cognition also would have to be regarded as preceded and produced by another Cognition.
It is for these reasons that even under the view that material substances are impermanent, the following objection urged by the Teacher, remains applicable—‘If the Cognition, once produced from the Body, becomes restricted to its own kind, through something else, then why should there be cessation of the Efficient Body?’
From all this it follows that Mental Cognition (Subjective Consciousness) is without beginning. Or it may be understood, that all Cognition, without exception, is without beginning. Because if the Cognition had a beginning,—then, when the Cognition would appear first of all, would it be Sensuous Cognition or Mental Cognition?—It could not be Sensuous Cognition; because in the case of men asleep, or in a swoon, or with mind elsewhere,—even though the Sense-organs are there, the Sensuous Cognition does not appear, on account of the absence of the mental functions. Hence it is understood that the Sense-organs alone cannot be the cause of Sensuous Cognition; they can be so only through the help of a particular functioning of the Mind; and it should be so understood because the causal relation between things is always determined by positive and negative concomitance.—When too one thing has been ascertained to be produced, at first, from a certain other thing,—it cannot obtain appearance before that from any third thing; as such appearance would be without a cause; as for example, if Smoke were held to proceed from non-fire. When the Sensuous Cognition has come about first of ah, it does so only through a favourable mental operation; hence it becomes established that the Sense-organ alone can never be its cause; otherwise it would be without a cause; this is an argument that annuls the said view.
Nor can the first Cognition be a Mental Cognition (the second alternative put forth on bottom of p. 530 of the Sanskrit Text). As a matter of fact, it never appears independently by itself in reference to anything not apprehended by the senses; if it did, there would be no deaf or blind persons.—Even if it did appear so,—it should be explained if it would be conceptual (determinate) or non-conceptual (indeterminate)?—It could not be conceptual; whenever Conceptual Thought operates it operates always as associated with verbal expression, expressive of the concept; because it is always found to appear in the form of an internal (unexpressed) verbal presentation; and this expressive verbal form of the Conceptual Thought could proceed either (a) from the comprehension of Convention,—or (b) from the fact of Word in the expressive form being a property of the Cognition itself, like the form of consciousness,—or (c) from the comprehension of the meaning of the Word. These are the only alternatives possible.
(а) It cannot be true that it proceeds from the comprehension of Convention; because the Convention has not yet been comprehended.
(b) Nor can the second alternative be accepted; because the essence-form—of the Word is twofold—‘Specific Individuality’ and ‘Universal’, Of these the ‘Specific Individuality’ of the Word is always apprehended in an inexpressive form; hence on that basis, the Cognition could (not) be conceptual (determinate). Nor is it a property of the Cognition itself, as it always appears as something external, like the Blue and other objects. If then, it were the property of the Cognition itself, then the Blue and other things also might be the property of the Cognition itself; as there would be nothing to distinguish between the two eases. In that case the entire universe would be mere Cognition, and not a modification of Material Substances.
Objection:—“According to the view that Cognition has forms, the Blue and other things are of the very essence of the Cognition, and it is these that appear as external; what then is it that is meant by the assertion that ‘because they appear in the external form they cannot be properties of the Cognition’?”
True; but the very fact of Cognition appearing in a form tainted by the external object leads us to conclude that it forms the essence,—not of the Cognition,—but of the external object; as therein lies its own essence. In the Cognition it appears only on account of certain circumstances and is purely adventitious.
From all this it follows that the Word in the form of ‘Specific Individuality’ cannot be expressive; nor can it be the property of the Cognition itself.
As regards Word in the form of the ‘Universal’,—though that is expressive, yet it cannot be a property of the Cognition itself; because it is tacked on, not to the Cognition itself but, to that which is comprehended on the hearing of the Specific Individuality of the Word appertaining to the external thing. The ‘Universal’ of one thing cannot be tacked on to another thing; if it were, then there would be incongruities in the Cognition; as in that case the Universal • Cow’ could be tacked on to the Horse. And until the thing, in the shape of the Specific Individuality has been apprehended, it is not possible to tack on to it that property which is expressive; for the simple reason that Properties are always dependent upon the Objects to which they belong, and as such cannot be apprehended by themselves. And the thing in the form of ‘Specific Individuality’ cannot be apprehended by conceptual thought; as this latter always envisages the ‘Universal’, Hence it becomes established that all Conceptual Thoughts have their source in the awakening of the Tendencies created by the beginningless apprehension of ‘Specific Individualities’.
(c) Nor, lastly, could the fact of the conceptual thought having the form of the expressive Word be due to the comprehension of what is expressed by the Word. Because words do not subsist in the object; nor are they of the nature of objects; for if they were so, they could be understood by the unlearned also; and it would, in that case, be impossible to apply words to things according to one’s own choice.
Further, though all objects are similar in so far as they are impermanent, yet Conceptual Thought cannot envisage them all at one and the same time; as each Conceptual Thought appears only in respect of certain well-defined objects with special forms, as differentiated from other forms. Hence the Cause that is pointed out should be through a conceptual thought that appertains to a single form. Such a cause cannot be indicated to be any other except Repeated Practice; as is found in the case of the Conceptual Thoughts appertaining to dead bodies (?). Thus then as the Conceptual Thought proceeds through previous repeated practice, it becomes proved that the Conceptual Cognition is without beginning.
Nor can it be right to accept the alternative (set forth on p. 53, line 7 of the original) that ‘the first Mental Cognition (or Subjective Consciousness) is non-conceptual—Because under that view there would never be any Conceptual Cognition at all.—It might be argued that—“in the manner explained before, it could appear later on on the basis of Conception”.—But that cannot be; so long as the man rests upon non-conceptual cognition, he cannot set up any Convention. Because no Convention can be set up until the Universal Word or the Universal Thing figures in the Cognition; what does figure in the Cognition however is the Specific Individuality, and no Convention can be made either in relation to it or upon its basis; because it is meant for the purposes of Usage, while the Specific Individuality that is seen at the time of the Convention can never be present at the time of usage; consequently it has to be admitted that there is Conceptual Thought before the Convention is made relating to the Specific Individuality. And this is not possible without repeated experience; so that there also it becomes established that the Cognition in question is without beginning.
Then again, if it is not admitted that ‘the first Cognition at birth is due to the continuity of the impressions left by the repeated experiences of previous lives’,—then, how would you account for the idea in the new-born babe,—even among animals—of a certain thing being a source of pleasure and another a source of pain? It is by virtue of such ideas that it seeks for the mother’s breasts which it regards as a source of pleasure, and it cries out when it does not find it, or having found it suddenly stops crying and proceeds to feed itself. Certainly during its present life, the baby has never experienced the fact of the breasts being the means of allaying the pangs of hunger. Nor has it had any experience of falling from a precipice being a source of hurt and pain; and yet even the newborn young of the monkey becomes afraid of death and the suffering caused by falling from a height, and, on account of that fear, clings more strongly to the mother’s arms; and also avoid the place where there is a precipice. Until people have had some actual experience of things bringing pleasure or pain, they never invariably seek to obtain the one and avoid the other. If they did, there would be an absurdity,—The example of the Iron being drawn to the Magnet cannot be properly cited in this connection; because that attraction is not without cause; if it were without cause, then it would always be there. If then it has a cause, it is the Magnet that is pointed out to be the cause on the basis of positive and negative concomitance; and some similar cause will have to be found for the action of the child in securing and avoiding certain things. No such cause can be indicated, apart from repeated experience. Hence it becomes established that the action of children in seeking to obtain and avoiding certain things is due to repeated past experience; and that, on this account, the Cognition must be without beiginning.
It is for these reasons that the author is going to indicate other objections applicable in common (to all the views of the Materialists)—under Texts 1930 and 1940 below,—Hence we desist from further details.
Further, if the Cārvākas admit the momentary character of things, then their own doctrine,—that Material substances are everlasting—becomes upset.—(1886)