1211 Verse 1784-1785

Original

शातकुम्भात्मकौ भावौ यदा पश्यति मूढधीः ।
समानापरभावेन स्थिरत्वं मन्यते तदा ॥ १७८४ ॥
हेम्नोऽवस्थितरूपत्वे तद्रूपं रुचकाद्यपि ।
पूर्वोत्तराद्यवस्थासु दृश्येतानेकताऽन्यथा ॥ १७८५ ॥

śātakumbhātmakau bhāvau yadā paśyati mūḍhadhīḥ |
samānāparabhāvena sthiratvaṃ manyate tadā || 1784 ||
hemno’vasthitarūpatve tadrūpaṃ rucakādyapi |
pūrvottarādyavasthāsu dṛśyetānekatā’nyathā || 1785 ||

When the dull-witted man perceives the two things made of gold, he looks upon it as a case of the appearance of similar products and thereby comes to think of it as something lasting.—If the gold itself had a lasting form, then that form, in the shape of the dish, could be perceived in its preceding and succeeding states also; or else, there would be diversity.—(1784-1785)

Kamalaśīla

When the dull -witted man perceives the two things—the Pot and the Dish—made of gold,—though perceiving it, he is not able to distinguish between the characters of the two things, being deceived by the appearance of another similar thing,—and then he has the idea of being similar products, which is the cause of his illusion, he concludes that the Gold has continued to remain all the time.

‘Samānāparabhāvena?;—though the common character of being negation of not-gold, the two articles are regarded as the same or similar; and the man regards it as a case of the birth of two things with a common character.

Question:—“How do you know that the man regards the gold as something lasting, on account of being deceived by the appearance of common products;—and not on account of the gold being really lasting?”

Answer:—‘If the gold, etc. etc.’—If eternality did belong to the gold, then the Dish also would be perceived in the Pot, which is perceptible. ‘Otherwise’—if the Dish is not perceived when the gold is in the state of the Pot, which should be perceptible,—or if the Pot is not perceived when the gold is in the state of the Dish, which should be perceptible,—then there is clear difference between the two (Dish and Pot); and as the gold is not-different from them, like its own nature—the gold also becomes diverse. It is in view of all this that the Text says—‘Or else, there would be diversity’,

Under Text 1717—“If the said entity, etc. etc.”—a Reason has been put forward in proof of the Diverse character of things.

The only objection we have to urge against that is that it is superfluous [proving what is already admitted].—(1784-1785)