Original
ननु नीलादिविज्ञानजननं लोचनं कथम् ।
व्यावृत्तरूपभागेव नीलादिभ्यो यदीष्यते ॥ १७६० ॥
नीलादिज्ञानजनकान्नीलादेर्भेदवद्यथा ।
श्रोत्रं न तस्य जनकं तथा चक्षुरपीष्यताम् ॥ १७६१ ॥
जनकाद्धि परावृत्तः कोऽपरो जनको भवेत् ।
भावस्तस्मात्पदार्थानामन्वयोऽपीति निश्चयः ॥ १७६२ ॥nanu nīlādivijñānajananaṃ locanaṃ katham |
vyāvṛttarūpabhāgeva nīlādibhyo yadīṣyate || 1760 ||
nīlādijñānajanakānnīlāderbhedavadyathā |
śrotraṃ na tasya janakaṃ tathā cakṣurapīṣyatām || 1761 ||
janakāddhi parāvṛttaḥ ko’paro janako bhavet |
bhāvastasmātpadārthānāmanvayo’pīti niścayaḥ || 1762 ||“How can the eye be productive of the cognition of the blue and other things,—if it is held to have that form alone which is differentiated from the blue and others? in fact, just as the ear is not regarded as productive of the cognition of blue, etc., on account of its being different from the blue, etc. which are productive of the cognition of blue, etc.,—so also the eye should not be regarded as the cause of that cognition.—How could any other thing, which is different from the productive cause, be productive of it?—from all this follows the conclusion that there must be inclusiveness also among things.”—(1760-1762)
Kamalaśīla
In the following Texts, the objection is raised that “the Corroborating Instance cited cannot be admitted”:—[see verses 1760-1762 above]
“If the Eye be held to be that which has a form exclusive of the Blue, etc.,—and not any that is inclusive; this is what is meant by the particle ‘eva’, ‘alone’;—in that case the Eye cannot be the cause of the perception of the Blue, etc.; because it has been differentiated (excluded) from what is productive of that perception;—when a tiring has been excluded from the Cause of a certain thing, it cannot be the Cause of that thing; e.g, the Ear which, being differentiated from the Blue, etc., which are the cause of the perception of the Blue, etc., is not the cause of the perception of the Blue, etc.;—the Eye also is (ex hypothesi) differentiated from the Blue, etc., which are the cause of the perception of Blue, etc.;—hence there is the possibility of an apprehension contrary to a universal truth.
As a matter of fact however, it is not so [i.e. the Eye is not non-productive of the perception of Blue, etc.].—Hence the truth should be otherwise than this; that is, when one thing is productive of another, it cannot be excluded from the nature of being so productive,—e.g. the Blue, which is productive of the perception of Blue, cannot be excluded from its own nature;—and the Eye is actually productive of the perception of the Blue, etc. So this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.
In the same way Blue, etc. may be made the Minor Term in the Reasoning.
From all this it follows that there is inclusiveness among things.
Thus through the contrary of the Beductio ad absurdum, it has been shown that the example cited is not admissible.—(1760-1762)