1191 Verse 1731-1732

Original

सजातीयविजातीयानेकव्यावृत्तवस्तुनः ।
ततस्ततः परावृत्तेर्धर्मभेदस्तु कथ्यते ॥ १७३१ ॥
एकस्यापि ततो युक्ता कल्पितासङ्ख्यरूपता ।
वास्तवं नैकभावस्य द्वैरूप्यमपि सङ्गतम् ॥ १७३२ ॥

sajātīyavijātīyānekavyāvṛttavastunaḥ |
tatastataḥ parāvṛtterdharmabhedastu kathyate || 1731 ||
ekasyāpi tato yuktā kalpitāsaṅkhyarūpatā |
vāstavaṃ naikabhāvasya dvairūpyamapi saṅgatam || 1732 ||

When an entity, excluded from several like and unlike things, is differentiated from this and that,—that is called ‘the diversity of properties’. In this way even a single thing may be assumed to have numberless diverse forms; but in reality, no single thing can reasonably have two forms.—(1731-1732)

Kamalaśīla

The following might be urged—“What is the basis of the assumption of the diversity of properties? There must be a distinct basis for it; otherwise there would be confusion among things. Hence it follows that that which would be that distinct basis would be the real ‘diversity of properties’ for us.”

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verses 1731-1732 above]

The compound ‘sajātīya, etc. etc.’ is to be expounded as—there is first a karmadhāraya compound between ‘like and unlike’ and ‘several’;—and from these the entity is ‘excluded’.—When such a single entity is differentiated from this and that,—like and unlike thing—this is what forms the basis of the idea of the ‘diversity of properties’. Thus, inasmuch as there can be an assumed ‘Plurality’,—there can be no reason for postulating a real, duality of form for any single thing.

The particle ‘api’ implies that there would be ‘superfluity’ in the Jaina writer’s argument if what were meant to be proved were the mere fact of the thing having in a general way, a diversity of properties.—(1731-1732)