Original
उभयानुभयात्मा हि नैवासौ युज्यते परः ।
एकस्यैकत्र विज्ञाने व्याहते हि क्रियाक्रिये ॥ १७०२ ॥
साक्षाद्धि ज्ञानजनकः प्रत्यक्षो ह्यर्थ उच्यते ।
यथोक्तविपरीतस्तु परोक्षः कृतिभिर्मतः ॥ १७०३ ॥
आद्यार्थविषयं तावन्नेदं शाब्दोपमादिकम् ।
प्रत्यक्षेऽन्तर्गतिप्राप्तेर्वैफल्यं वा स्मृतेरिव ॥ १७०४ ॥
परोक्षविषयत्वेऽपि सर्वेषां विषयः कथम् ।
यदि साक्षात्परोक्षोऽयं न स्यात्प्रत्यक्षवस्तुवत् ॥ १७०५ ॥
परव्यपाश्रयेणापि प्रतिपत्तौ किमस्य सा ।
सम्बद्धेतरतो नो वा भेदाभासा न वा तथा ॥ १७०६ ॥
असम्बद्धात्तदुद्भूतावव्यवस्था प्रसज्यते ।
न च संगच्छते व्याप्तिर्भेदाभासा भवेद्यदि ॥ १७०७ ॥
परोक्षविषया यावत्सम्बद्धार्थसमाश्रया ।
अपरामृष्टतद्भेदा प्रतीतिरनुमा स्फुटा ॥ १७०८ ॥ubhayānubhayātmā hi naivāsau yujyate paraḥ |
ekasyaikatra vijñāne vyāhate hi kriyākriye || 1702 ||
sākṣāddhi jñānajanakaḥ pratyakṣo hyartha ucyate |
yathoktaviparītastu parokṣaḥ kṛtibhirmataḥ || 1703 ||
ādyārthaviṣayaṃ tāvannedaṃ śābdopamādikam |
pratyakṣe’ntargatiprāptervaiphalyaṃ vā smṛteriva || 1704 ||
parokṣaviṣayatve’pi sarveṣāṃ viṣayaḥ katham |
yadi sākṣātparokṣo’yaṃ na syātpratyakṣavastuvat || 1705 ||
paravyapāśrayeṇāpi pratipattau kimasya sā |
sambaddhetarato no vā bhedābhāsā na vā tathā || 1706 ||
asambaddhāttadudbhūtāvavyavasthā prasajyate |
na ca saṃgacchate vyāptirbhedābhāsā bhavedyadi || 1707 ||
parokṣaviṣayā yāvatsambaddhārthasamāśrayā |
aparāmṛṣṭatadbhedā pratītiranumā sphuṭā || 1708 ||Any other kind is not possible,—in the shape of both perceptible—and imperceptible, or neither perceptible—nor—imperceptible. Because in any single thing, both action and inaction would be selfcontradictory. That thing is called ‘perceptible’ which produces its cognition directly (immediately); the contrary of this is regarded by the wise, as ‘imperceptible’.—Now verbal cognition, analogical cognition and the rest cannot envisage the former (perceptible) thing; as in that case they would become included under ‘perception’, or be futile, like remembrance.—Even if they envisage imperceptible things, in what way could anything be envisaged by all? If directly (immediately), then the thing would not be ‘imperceptible’, being exactly like the perceptible thing. If the cognitions are dependent upon something else (i.e. indirect, mediate), would the cognition be related to it or not related? Would it envisage distinction or not?—If it arose out of what is not related, then there could be no restriction; and if it envisages distinction, then there could be no invariable concomitance. If, lastly, the cognition envisages an imperceptible thing,—is based upon a related object—and does not envisage distinction from it,—then it is clearly ‘inference’.—(1702-1708)
Kamalaśīla
It cannot be right for any one thing to contain within itself a mixture of mutually contradictory properties;—if it did contain such, it would cease to be one thing. For instance, that thing is called ‘Perceptible’ which brings about the cognition of the thing as it exists, directly,—i.e. without the intervention of the Inferential Indicative or such other means of cognition. On this principle, such cognitions as ‘Sound is momentary’ would be one envisaging an imperceptible Thing. One and. the same thing cannot be regarded as both active and inactive as regards anything; by virtue of which anything could be both—Perceptible—and—Imperceptible—as producing and not-producing a certain cognition.
Nor can a thing be neither—Perceptible—nor—Imperceptible; because in regard to anything, the negation of one character always implies the affirma. lion of the contrary character. If there are more things than one, then there is no incongruity in there being both action and inaction in any given case; e.g. the action and inaction of Colour and Taste (both) in regard to Visual Perception. Nor is there any incongruity in both action and inaction of even one thing, if it is in reference to more things than one; e.g. that of Colour with reference to both Visual and Auditory Perceptions.—It is in view of tlxis that the Text says—‘In any single thing, both action and Inaction would be self-contradictory
For all these reasons, things are of only two kinds—(Perceptible and Imperceptible).
Now’, if the Word and other Means of cognition were distinct Means of Cognition,—there could be only two alternatives regarding them—they envisage either (a) the Perceptible Thing, or (b) the Imperceptible Thing.
They cannot envisage the Perceptible Thing.—“Why?”—Because in that case they would be liable to become included under ‘Perception’; as the Verbal and other Cognitions, in that case, would envisage those same things that are envisaged by Perception.—It might be urged that—“the other Means of Cognition bring about the Cognition of the thing concerned after it has been envisaged by Perception”;—the answer to that is that ‘it would be futile’; that is, apprehending what is already apprehended, the Cognitions would be invalid,—likeRemembrance.
Under the second alternative also (that Verbal and other cognitions envisage Imperceptible Things)—when the Imperceptible thing is cognised—would it be cognised directly, or indirectly, through the intervention of something else?—It cannot be cognised directly; as, in that case it would be like any perceptible thing and would cease to be imperceptible. Because it is called ‘Imperceptible’ only because it does not produce cognitions directly; if then, it were to produce cognitions directly, how could it be called ‘Imperceptible’?
If the cognition of the Imperceptible thing were produced through the intervention of something else,—(1) would it be produced through the intervention of something related to it? (2) of something not related to it? (3) would it envisage distinction? or (4) envisage non-distinction?—These four alternatives are possible.—As an example of cognition envisaging distinction, there is the cognition of a particular Fire—produced by Leaves or Grass, produced through smoke in general. An example of cognition envisaging non-distinction, there is the cognition of mere Fire as excluded from other unlike things, produced by Smoke.—Now if this latter cognition were brought about by the intervention of a thing (Smoke) not related, to the thing concerned (Fire),—there would be no restriction at all; anything might bring about the cognition of anything.—If the cognition envisage distinction, then there would be no Invariable Concomitance between the Probans and the Probandum; as there would be no concomitance regarding the qualifying factor; and to that extent, the Probans would be Inconclusive.—If then the cognition envisaged non-distinction, then it would be included under ‘Inference
All this is what is urged in the Text—‘If, lastly, the Cognition, etc. etc.;—and does not envisage distinction, etc. etc.—That is, devoid of all tinge of distinction, envisaging the mere object as excluded from all unlike things; e.g. the cognition of mere Fire, from Smoke.—If the cognition in question is of this kind, then it is clearly Inference, as brought about by the perception of Relation,—as the cognition of Fire, from Smoke.—(1702-1708)
End of Chapter XIX.