1168 Verse 1692-1695

Original

अस्मिन्सति भवत्येव न भवत्यसतीति च ।
तस्मादतो भवत्येव युक्तिरेषाऽभिधीयते ॥ १६९२ ॥
प्रमाणान्तरमेवेयमित्याह चरको मुनिः ।
नानुमानमियं यस्माद्दृष्टान्तोऽत्र न लभ्यते ॥ १६९३ ॥
उपलब्ध्या यया योऽर्थो ज्ञायते तदभावतः ।
नास्तित्वं गम्यते तस्यानुपलब्धिरियं मता ॥ १६९४ ॥
प्रमाणान्तरमेषाऽपि दृष्टान्ताद्यनपेक्षणात् ।
दृष्टान्तेऽपि हि नास्तित्वमनयैव प्रसिद्ध्यति ॥ १६९५ ॥

asminsati bhavatyeva na bhavatyasatīti ca |
tasmādato bhavatyeva yuktireṣā’bhidhīyate || 1692 ||
pramāṇāntarameveyamityāha carako muniḥ |
nānumānamiyaṃ yasmāddṛṣṭānto’tra na labhyate || 1693 ||
upalabdhyā yayā yo’rtho jñāyate tadabhāvataḥ |
nāstitvaṃ gamyate tasyānupalabdhiriyaṃ matā || 1694 ||
pramāṇāntarameṣā’pi dṛṣṭāntādyanapekṣaṇāt |
dṛṣṭānte’pi hi nāstitvamanayaiva prasiddhyati || 1695 ||

(a) “that thing comes about when this thing is there, and it does not come about, when it is not there,—therefore it proceeds from that”,—this is called ‘ratiocination’. The sage Caraka has declared that it is a distinct means of cognition; because it cannot be inference, as no corroborative instance is available”.—(b) “When a certain thing is cognisable by an apprehension,—then, from the absence of that apprehension, one deduces the non-existence of that thing;—this is regarded as ‘non-apprehension’.—This also is a distinct means of cognition, as it does not need a corroborative instance and other factors. In fact, in the instance also, non-existence would be cognised by means of this same ‘non-apprehension’.”—(1692-1695)

Kamalaśīla

The author argues as follows, in connection with ‘Ratiocination’ and ‘Non-apprehension’ (as distinct Means of Cognition):—[see verses 1692-1695 above]

When a thing is cognised as being the effect of a certain thing, on the ground of its being produced only when the latter is present,—it is regarded as a case of ‘Ratiocination’,—As it is conceptual, it cannot be Perception; nor can it be Inference, as there is no Corroborative Instance; and if there were an Instance, then also the notion of being an effect would be due to being produced only when the other is present; and in support of that, another instance would have to be sought for; and so on and on, there would be an infinite regress.—Hence this is a distinct Means of Cognition; so says the sage Caraka, the medical doctor.

Similarly, when there is cognition of the non-existence of a thing derived from the absence of its apprehension, it is a case of ‘Non-apprehension’; and the reasons for regarding this also as a distinct Means of Cognition are to be found as in the case of ‘Ratiocination’—(1692-1695)

The above is refuted in the following:—[see verse 1696 next]