1166 Verse 1691

Original

अभावो वा प्रमाणेन स्वानुरूपेण मीयते ।
इत्यत्र सिद्धसाध्यत्वं तादृश्यस्त्यनुरूपता ॥ १६९१ ॥

abhāvo vā pramāṇena svānurūpeṇa mīyate |
ityatra siddhasādhyatvaṃ tādṛśyastyanurūpatā || 1691 ||

As regards the contention (under text 1659) that “negation must be cognised by a means which is of the same nature as itself”,—this is entirely superfluous; as even in what we assert there is that sameness of nature.—(1691)

Kamalaśīla

‘There is that sameness of nature’,—the ‘non-apprehension’, in the shape of the apprehension of something else, being negative in character.

In this connection, some people urge the following objection;—“The cognition that envisages merely the absence of things cannot be included under Perception and the rest,—because it envisages only the absence (negation) of things, while Perception and the rest envisage positive things;—nor can it be regarded as invalid,—as it is in conformity with the real state of things. When you (Buddhists) postulate the absolute destruction of things, you cannot deny the absence of things

What has been explained above disposes of tins objection also. In the case in question, what the particular Conceptual Thought envisages is not pure negation devoid of all specifications of time, place, etc.,—it envisages the qualified Negation in the form that at a certain place ‘the Jar is not’; and that it is so is due to the fact that the Place, etc. have the capacity of being perceived. Thus it is that Negation is not regarded as a distinct Means or Form of Cognition; because what is conceived is only such empty place as has been apprehended by Perception.—Even if there were apprehension of pure, unqualified, Negation, the cognition apprehending it could not be regarded as valid, because it would be envisaging a non-entity; and all consideration of the validity of cognitions, by men seeking for effective action, relates to entities only.—What has been urged therefore is beneath notice.—(1691)

End of Negation.