1148 Verse 1657

Original

मानं कथमभावश्चेत्प्रमेयं चात्र कीदृशम् ।
मेयो यद्वदभावो हि मानमप्येवमिष्यताम् ॥ १६५७ ॥

mānaṃ kathamabhāvaścetprameyaṃ cātra kīdṛśam |
meyo yadvadabhāvo hi mānamapyevamiṣyatām || 1657 ||

“If it be asked—‘how can negation be a means (or form) of cognition?’—Our answer is—what sort of object is it that is cognised by it? Just as the cognisable object is negative, so should the means (or form) of cognition also be understood to be.”—[Ślokavārtika-negation, 45].—(1657)

Kamalaśīla

Kumārila has described three lands of Negation:—(1) the ‘Nonmodification of the Soul’;—(2) ‘the Cognition of some other particular object’,—as declared under Text 1649 (which is a quotation from the Ślokavārtika—Negation, 11),—and (3) ‘mere cessation (non-functioning) of all Means of Cognition’, as described by him in this passage—‘That Cognition is regarded (by the Buddhist) as Inference which is brought about by the three-featured Probans; but that Means of Cognition which consists in not being brought about (i.e, Negation) cannot stand in need of a Cause’—(Ślokavārtika—Negation, 44).

In regard to this third kind of Negation, the following Text anticipates and answers an objection:—[see verse 1657 above]

The following point may be raised—How can ‘Negation’, which consists in non-appearance of Perception, be a Means of Cognition?

The answer to this is—What sort of Object is it that is cognised by it?

The rejoinder may be—“What is cognised is negative in character.”

In that case (our answer would be that), the Means of Cognition also should be understood to be of the same nature as the Object cognised; why then should it be asked—how Negation can be a Means of Cognition?— Certainly it cannot be denied that the Means can be of the same nature as the Object.—(1657)