1144 Verse 1650

Original

प्रमाभावाच्च वस्तूनामभावः संप्रतीयते ।
चतुर्धा च विभिन्नोऽसौ प्रागभावादिभेदतः ॥ १६५० ॥

pramābhāvācca vastūnāmabhāvaḥ saṃpratīyate |
caturdhā ca vibhinno’sau prāgabhāvādibhedataḥ || 1650 ||

“The negation (absence) of things is apprehended when there is no apprehension of the things themselves; and it is divided under four heads—‘the previous negation’ and the rest.”—(1650)

Kamalaśīla

Objection:—It is the absence of things that is called ‘Abhāva’, ‘Negation’; how then can it be an entity? Certainly the absence cannot be an entity.

Anticipating’ this objection, the Mīmāṃsaka proceeds to prove that Negation is an entity:—[see verse 1650 above]

If the ‘Negation of the Means of Cognition’ were not an entity, then, as a non-entity, it would have no capacity at all; so that there could be no cognition or idea of it;—nor would there be any division of Negation into the four kinds of ‘Previous Negation’ and so forth. And yet this is not so. Hence inasmuch as the Idea of Negation cannot be otherwise explained,—and as the well-known fourfold division also of it cannot be otherwise accounted for,—Negation must be regarded as an entity.

Some people hold that these two ‘Presumptions’ afford the proof for Negation being an entity.

Others however explain that the sentence (in the Text) to the effect ‘It is divided under four heads’ embodies an Inference; and they formulate it as follows:—Negation is an entity,—because it is divided,—like the Jar and other things.—(1650)

The following Texts proceed to show how ‘it is divided under four heads’:—[see verses 1651-1654 next]