Original
नैवमप्रतिबद्धे हि सामर्थ्ये सन्ततं भवेत् ।
तज्ज्ञानं तद्वियोगे तु नैव स्यात्तत्कदाचन ॥ १६३९ ॥
ततश्च व्यञ्जकास्तासां सङ्गच्छन्ते न हेतवः ।
प्रत्यभिज्ञा तु नित्यत्वे पूर्वमेव निराकृता ॥ १६४० ॥naivamapratibaddhe hi sāmarthye santataṃ bhavet |
tajjñānaṃ tadviyoge tu naiva syāttatkadācana || 1639 ||
tataśca vyañjakāstāsāṃ saṅgacchante na hetavaḥ |
pratyabhijñā tu nityatve pūrvameva nirākṛtā || 1640 ||It cannot be so; so long as the capacity is not obstructed, its. Cognition should be there always; in the absence of the said capacity, it should never be there at all. thus no ‘indicators’ are possible for the gestures, as regards ‘recognition’ indicating eternality, that has been already rejected.—(1639-1640)
Kamalaśīla
There are only two alternatives possible regarding the capacity of the Gestures which are held to be ‘indicated’ by certain indicators:—By their nature (a) they have the capacity of bringing about cognitions—or (b) they do not have this capacity.
If they have the said capacity, then the Cognition producible by these should be there always—at all times; because their nature, being eternal, could not be obstructed by anything; because a thing to which (on account of its Etemality) no peculiarities can be added, can never, for that reason, be obstructed.
If, on the other hand, they do not have the capacity, then, in the absence of the capacity, the cognition producible by them could never be there. So where would be the use of the Indicator?
For these reasons, it is not possible for the Gestures, which are held to be eternal, to have any ‘indicators If they are non-eternal, however, it is possible for a new character to be produced by the Indicators, and hence in this case, the presence of Indicatives would be logical.
It has been asserted that—“They are held to be eternal, like Letters, on the ground of Recognition”.—The answer to that is—‘As regards Recognition,, etc. etc.’;—for the proving of eternality (the Probandun), Recognition has been put forward as the Probans; and tins Recognition has been already rejected under the examination of the Permanence of Things (Chapter VIII).—(1639-1640)