1082 Verse 1557-1558

Original

तरुपङ्क्त्यादिसंदृष्टावेकपादपदर्शनात् ।
द्वितीयशाखिविज्ञानादाद्योऽसाविति निश्चयः ॥ १५५७ ॥
प्रमाणान्तरमासक्तं सादृश्याद्यनपेक्षणात् ।
गृहीतग्रहणान्नो चेत्समानमुपमास्वपि ॥ १५५८ ॥

tarupaṅktyādisaṃdṛṣṭāvekapādapadarśanāt |
dvitīyaśākhivijñānādādyo’sāviti niścayaḥ || 1557 ||
pramāṇāntaramāsaktaṃ sādṛśyādyanapekṣaṇāt |
gṛhītagrahaṇānno cetsamānamupamāsvapi || 1558 ||

When a line of trees and such things are seen, what is actually perceived is only one tree, and yet some idea of the second tree being there, there follows the definite cognition (in regard to the former tree) that ‘this is the first’;—and this will have to be regarded as a distinct form of cognition; as it does not depend upon any element of ‘similarity’ or other conditions (attendant upon the well-known forms of cognition).—If it is denied in this case, on the ground that it apprehends only what has been already apprehended,—then the same might be said in regard to analogical cognitions also.—(1557-1558)

Kamalaśīla

‘And such things’—is meant to include the line of Ants and so on.

As a matter of fact, when one sees a line of trees,—so long as one sees one of the trees only, there is no such definite cognition as that ‘this is the first tree’; when however, he notices the second tree, there does come about, in reference to the former tree, the idea that ‘this is the first tree’;—and this would have to be regarded as a distinct form of Cognition (even if the contention of the Mīmāṃsaka in regard to Analogical cognition were accepted).—Why?—Because it is a form of cognition not dependent upon any element of Similarity or such other conditions. So that, because it does not depend upon Similarity, therefore it cannot be analogical cognition;—because it does not depend upon the operation of the Senses, therefore it cannot be Sense-perception;—because it does not depend upon an Inferential Indicative, therefore it cannot be Inference;—because it does not depend upon Words, it cannot be Verbal Cognition;—because it does not depend upon any seen or heard of fact which would be otherwise inexplicable, therefore it cannot be Presumption -and because it does not depend upon the cessation of Means and Objects of Cognition, therefore it cannot be Negation.—Thus there is room for the absurdity urged in the following declaration—‘This is prior to that,—This is posterior to that—This is larger than that—This is shorter than that—all these cognitions would have to be regarded as so many distinct Forms of Cognition,—which is highly undesirable’,

It might be urged that—“as the cognition in question apprehends what has been already apprehended, it cannot be regarded as Valid Cognition”,—this condition, of apprehending what has been already apprehended, is present in Analogical Cognitions also.

The plural number in ‘Analogical Cognitions’ is in view of the fact that there are many such Cognitions.—(1557-1558)