1034 Verse 1484

Original

अप्रमाणेन चैतेन परः किं प्रतिपद्यते ।
अप्रमाणकृतश्चासौ प्रत्ययः कीदृशो भवेत् ॥ १४८४ ॥

apramāṇena caitena paraḥ kiṃ pratipadyate |
apramāṇakṛtaścāsau pratyayaḥ kīdṛśo bhavet || 1484 ||

If this (inference) is not a means of knowledge, then what does the other party understand by it?—Of what sort too would that cognition be which has been brought about by what is not a means of cognition?—(1484)

Kamalaśīla

It might be argued that—“No Inference is admitted by us at all;—hut the other party have, accepted it as a Means of Right Cognition; and in view of this latter, our assertion is not useless”.

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verse 1484 above]

How have you come to the conclusion that your opponent has accepted Inference as a Means of Knowledge? The idea of another man cannot be known by Sense-perception; and for you there is no other Means of Right Knowledge whereby you could derive a definite Cognition?

Even if there be such a definite Cognition; oven so, if what the other party accepts is not a means of Cognition, then how does his opponent know what it means? The accepting of a Means of Knowledge cannot be a mere whim.

It might be argued that—“Just as a man wrests the sword from the hands of his enemy and by that same sword fells the enemy,—in the same way the Atheist takes up what the other regards as a Means of Right Cognition and then by that same attacks his opponent”.

The answer to this is—‘Of what sort, etc. etc:’;—what is meant is as follows:—If, through delusion, the other party has accepted as Means of Right Knowledge, what is really not a Means of Knowledge, then, how can it be possible for one to bring about the right Cognition in the mind of that party, by means of what is not a Means of Right Cognition, as right Cognition is the only resultant of the Means of Knowledge? Certainly, if a man has taken up, as sword, what is not-sword,—another man cannot take up that and strike the other with it. The example cited therefore is not analogous.—(1484)