1032 Verse 1479-1481

Original

त्रिरूपलिङ्गवचसः सक्तसंसूचकत्वतः ।
यत्परार्थानुमानत्वमुक्तं तच्छ्रोत्रपेक्षया ॥ १४७९ ॥
गौणं साङ्केतिकं चैवमनुमानत्वमाश्रितम् ।
सक्तसंसूचकत्वेन तेन नातिप्रसज्यते ॥ १४८० ॥
नानुमानं प्रमाणं चेद्विफला व्याहतिस्तव ।
न कश्चिदपि वादो हि विवक्षां प्रतिपद्यते ॥ १४८१ ॥

trirūpaliṅgavacasaḥ saktasaṃsūcakatvataḥ |
yatparārthānumānatvamuktaṃ tacchrotrapekṣayā || 1479 ||
gauṇaṃ sāṅketikaṃ caivamanumānatvamāśritam |
saktasaṃsūcakatvena tena nātiprasajyate || 1480 ||
nānumānaṃ pramāṇaṃ cedviphalā vyāhatistava |
na kaścidapi vādo hi vivakṣāṃ pratipadyate || 1481 ||

The statement of the three-featured probans has been described as ‘inference for the benefit of another’, on the ground of its being indicative of what is possible,—with reference to the other person addressed. but this ‘inferential character’ can only be ‘secondary’ (figurative) and conventional. hence the fact of its being ‘indicative of what is possible’ cannot lead to any incongruity.—if inference is not a means of right cognition, then your assertion is useless. Indeed no disputant ever comprehends what you wish to speak of.—(1479-1481)

Kamalaśīla

It has been argued (under Text 1468) that—“the Inference for another’s benefit cannot be valid, etc. etc.”.

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verses 1479-1481 above]

The statement (of the Inference) has been spoken of as ‘for another’s benefit’, in reference to the other person; hence it cannot be open to the objection urged against its being in reference to the speaker himself.

Even in reference to the listener, the other person, as there is the setting forth of the three-featured Probans,—and on that account, it leads to the Inference,—or on account of Convention,—it has been spoken of as ‘Inference’; this name ‘Inference’ being applicable only to what is indicative of what is possible. Consequently, there can be no such incongruity as that of the Sense-organ, or the cognition of the relation of Invariable Concomitance, being regarded as ‘Inference for another’s benefit’; as in those cases, there is no ‘indication of what is possible’. It is for this same reason that this Inference differs from the cognition based upon actual Perception. For instance, the cognition of the Indicative, Smoke, is directly brought about by Visual Perception, not by Auditory Perception; as what is directly apprehended by the latter is the Word (uttered by the Man) only; and the Word is not the indicative of the external thing (Fire), in the way that Smoke is; because the Word is related to the speaker’s wish to speak (which is subjective), and hence it can have no relation (of invariable concomitance) with anything external (objective); all that the word does is to indicate the presence of Smoke; and it is through Convention that it brings about the conceptual Cognition (associated with words), and hence, in reference to the external thing, it comes to be described as being ‘for the benefit of others And when what is meant to be understood is only the Speaker’s wish to speak, then it turns out to be ‘for the Speaker’s own benefit’, Because it is held to be indicative of the Speaker’s wish to speak of what contains the Smoke, which is the effect of the statement in question; it is ‘indicative’, not expressive, of it; because no other cognition is comprehended from it.

‘Your assertion is useless’;—i.e. the assertion that “Inference is not the means of right cognition”.—Because as a matter of fact, from the said statement, no person to whom it is addressed, comprehends what you wish to speak of.—This shows that your assertion involves ‘self-contradiction’.—This has been explained previously.—(1479-1481)