आगमे विश्वासटिप्पन्यः

Original

अस्ति चात्रापि विस्पष्टं वैधर्म्येण निदर्शनम् ।
तदेव तेषां स्वं रूपं प्रयाति हि विपक्षताम् ॥ १४०४ ॥
कथंचन सदात्मत्वसाधनेपि निरात्मसु ।
इष्टसिद्धिरसिद्धिश्च वैधर्माप्तिस्तथैव च ॥ १४०५ ॥

asti cātrāpi vispaṣṭaṃ vaidharmyeṇa nidarśanam |
tadeva teṣāṃ svaṃ rūpaṃ prayāti hi vipakṣatām || 1404 ||
kathaṃcana sadātmatvasādhanepi nirātmasu |
iṣṭasiddhirasiddhiśca vaidharmāptistathaiva ca || 1405 ||

Here also, there is a clear corroborative instance per dissimilarity; that same form of the things becomes the thing where the probandum is known to be absent,—in the proving of the character of ‘being somehow existent’ in regard to non-entities,—there would be ‘proving of what is already admitted’; also ‘inadmissibility’, and the concomitance of the contrary character in that way.—(1404-1405)

Kamalaśīla

It has been argued that—“there being nothing where the Probandum is known to be absent, there can be no Corroborative Instance per dissimilarity”.—The answer to that is as follows:—[see verses 1404-1405 above]

That form in which the Jar, etc. are apprehended,—if their existence in that form is accepted by them, then, in that case, that same character would also serve as the Instance per dissimilarity; because in that character, the Probans—‘being unapprehended’—will have ceased to exist.

Similarly in the case of the argument regarding things being ‘somehow existent’, the defect of ‘futility’ would be present.

‘Nirātmasu’—i.e. in non-entities.

‘Concomitance of the contrary character’;—i.e. the ‘contrary character’,—in the shape of the cessation of the Probandum—would be pervaded by (concomitant with) the absence of the Probans.

‘In that way’—i.e. by the possibility of the Instance per dissimilarity.—(1404-1405)