0984 Verse 1386-1388

Original

अथेदं लक्षणं हेतोर्धर्मिण्येवावगम्यते ।
यतः प्रमाणान्नासिद्धिः साध्यस्यापि ततो न तु ॥ १३८६ ॥
साध्यस्याप्रतिपत्तौ हि हेतोरपि न निश्चयः ।
अतो निरर्थको हेतुरन्यतः साध्यसिद्धितः ॥ १३८७ ॥
अन्योन्याश्रयदोषश्च हेतोः साध्यस्य निश्चये ।
द्वयोरन्यरासिद्धावन्यस्याप्यविनिश्चये ॥ १३८८ ॥

athedaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ hetordharmiṇyevāvagamyate |
yataḥ pramāṇānnāsiddhiḥ sādhyasyāpi tato na tu || 1386 ||
sādhyasyāpratipattau hi hetorapi na niścayaḥ |
ato nirarthako heturanyataḥ sādhyasiddhitaḥ || 1387 ||
anyonyāśrayadoṣaśca hetoḥ sādhyasya niścaye |
dvayoranyarāsiddhāvanyasyāpyaviniścaye || 1388 ||

If the proposed definition of the probans is meant to be one that is found in the minor term only,—then that same means of cognition which has made the probans known would make known the probandum also. If the probandum does not become known, then the probans also cannot become known. Thus the probans would be useless, the probandum having become known by other means.—There would be the incongruity of ‘mutual interdependence’ also, if the definite cognition of the probandum followed from the probans; and between these two, the cognition of one would be dependent upon the cognition of the other.—(1386-1388)

Kamalaśīla

The following Texts point out the objections against the second alternative noted above (under Text 1380):—[see verses 1386-1388 above]

The Probans may be defined as being inseparable from the Probandum in the Minor Term only,—as asserted in the following words—“The character of the Probans is held by others to exist in the Instance and to be not seen apart from the Probandum; in my opinion however, it is that which does not exist in the Minor Term apart from the Probandum; the followers of Śabara derive this knowledge from Presumption, and the followers of Bhikṣu, from Inference; for us, Inference is something totally different, like Narasiṃha (having a dual character)”.

[In this passage]—‘Dharmiṇi’—In the Minor term;—i.e. that in which the existence of the Probandum is sought to be proved;—‘Amunā’—i.e. what is sought to be proved. That which is incapable of existing in the Minor Term apart from the Probandum;—this is meant to be the definition (of Probans).

If such be the definition of the Probans, then that same Means of Cognition by which the Probans would be known as inseparable from the Probandum, as existent in the object where the Probandum is sought to be proved,—that same Means of Cognition would have made known the Probandum also (as present in the Minor Term);—so that the Probans would be entirely useless.

If the Probandum is not known, then the Probans also is not known; because the Probans has been defined as what is present in the Minor Term inseparably from the Probandum; and this inseparability from the Probandum cannot be known if the Probandum is not known; so that the Probandum would remain ‘unknown’, because the cognition of inseparability depends upon the Cognition of both.

It might be urged that—“The Probans may be known by other means of cognition”;—then what is the use of the Probans, the Probandum having become known already?

Further, if the definite cognition of the Probandum were dependent upon the Probans, then there would be the incongruity of mutual interdependence.

Question:—“How?”

Answer:—‘If the definite Cognition, etc. etc.’;—the cognition of the Probandum would be dependent upon the cognition of the Probans,—as therein alone lies the use of the Probans,—and the cognition of the Probans, which is characterised by inseparability from the Probandum, would be dependent upon the cognition of the Probandum; thus there would be clear mutual inter-dependence—(1386-1388)