0963 Verse 1350-1351

Original

परिच्छेदफलत्वेन वृत्तस्यानन्तरस्य हि ।
कारणत्वं मतं ज्ञाने प्रमाणे तु फलं परम् ॥ १३५० ॥
स्वसंवित्तिफलत्वं चेन्निषेधान्नैव युज्यते ।
माने च विषयाकारे भिन्नार्थत्वं प्रसज्यते ॥ १३५१ ॥

paricchedaphalatvena vṛttasyānantarasya hi |
kāraṇatvaṃ mataṃ jñāne pramāṇe tu phalaṃ param || 1350 ||
svasaṃvittiphalatvaṃ cenniṣedhānnaiva yujyate |
māne ca viṣayākāre bhinnārthatvaṃ prasajyate || 1351 ||

The ‘fruit’ consisting in the apprehension of the object, the character of the ‘means of cognition’ must belong to what goes immediately before it. Hence if the cognition be held to be the ‘means then the ‘fruit’ must be something else.—It cannot be right to attribute the character of the ‘fruit’ to the self-recognition (by the cognition), as this is going to be refuted later on. Nor can it be right to assert that the ‘means’ consists in the form of the object (cognised); as in that case there would be a diversity of objectives”—[Ślokavārtika—sense-perception, 78-79],—(1350-1351)

Kamalaśīla

The following Texts sets forth the character of the ‘Fruit’ as proposed by Kumārila:—[see verses 1350-1351 above]

‘What goes, etc. etc.’—i.e. the Eye and the other sense-organs.

‘The Fruit must be something else’;—in the form of rejecting or acquiring or ignoring the thing cognised;—this also has been declared by Kumārila himself.

As regards ‘self-recognition’ (by the Cognition), that has been refuted; hence that cannot be regarded as the ‘Fruit’ of Right Cognition.

If the form of the object be held to be the Means of Cognition, then the objectives of the Means and the Fruit would be different; for instance, the form of the object would be something external (objective), while the self-recognition of the Cognition would have the form of the Cognition itself (which is purely subjective).—(1350-1351)

The above argument is answered in the following—[see verse 1352 next]