Original
तन्नाध्यवसिताकारप्रतिरूपा न विद्यते ।
तत्राप्यर्थक्रियावाप्तिरन्यथाऽतिप्रसज्यते ॥ १३२५ ॥
केशादिप्रतिभासे च ज्ञाने संवादिभावतः ।
आलोकादेरतस्तस्य दुर्निवारा प्रमाणताः ॥ १३२६ ॥tannādhyavasitākārapratirūpā na vidyate |
tatrāpyarthakriyāvāptiranyathā’tiprasajyate || 1325 ||
keśādipratibhāse ca jñāne saṃvādibhāvataḥ |
ālokāderatastasya durnivārā pramāṇatāḥ || 1326 ||This cannot be right the effective action available is not in keeping with the form apprehended. otherwise there would be incongruities; as in the cognition where there is appearance of the hair and such things, there is compatibility, though only with the light (which is not apprehended) and other details; hence the validity of this would be irresistible (under the opponent’s view).—(1325-1326)
Kamalaśīla
The validity of a cognition is of two kinds—(1) when there is compatibility with the appearance, and (2) when there is compatibility with the Apprehension.—In the case in question (of the idea of the ‘yellow conch-shell’), the ‘absence of incongruence’—(i.e. compatibility)—is not in accordance with the appearance, as what appears—what is apparent—is the yellow conch-shell; and yet what is found (on touching) is not the yellow thing;—nor is its compatibility in accordance with the apprehension, because it is the yellow thing itself that is apprehended as capable of a particular fruitful activity; and yet no fruitful activity in that form is actually found.—Nor can there be validity even when there is compatibility with what is not apprehended at all; as that would lead to absurdity; as in the case of the cognition of the Hair-tuft also, what is actually got at is only the light (whose reflections create the impression of the Hair-tuft).—(1325-1326)