Original
अविकल्पमपि ज्ञानं विकल्पोत्पत्तिशक्तिमत् ।
निःशेषव्यवहाराङ्गं तद्द्वारेण भवत्यतः ॥ १३०६ ॥avikalpamapi jñānaṃ vikalpotpattiśaktimat |
niḥśeṣavyavahārāṅgaṃ taddvāreṇa bhavatyataḥ || 1306 ||As a matter of fact, even the non-conceptual perception has the potency to bring about the conceptual content; hence through that, it becomes a factor in all activity.—(1306)
Kamalaśīla
Says the Opponent:—“If Sense-perception is non-conceptual, how is activity carried on on its basis?—‘This is a means of bringing happiness’, ‘this is a source of unhappiness’,—one always makes up his mind definitely on these lines and then betakes himself to activity for the securing of the former and the avoiding of the latter.—Further (under your view) there can be no idea of Inference or Inferred; because at the time of Inference, the character in question, as also the subject wherein it is sought to be proved, must be such as have been previously cognised in a definite form;—and they could not be regarded as definitely cognised by a Perception that is itself uncertain. Nor could it be regarded as cognised by Inference; as that would mean an infinite regress of Inferences. There is no third Means of Bight Cognition (for the Buddhist, except Perception and Inference). So that under your view, there would be an end to all forms of activity.—From all this, and on the basis of the Beason that activities are actually carried on on the basis of Inference, etc., it becomes established that the idea of Perception being non-conceptual is ruled out by Inference”.
To one who would argue thus, the Author offers the following answer:—[see verse 1306 above]
‘Through that’—That is, through the Conceptual Content, the Non-conceptual Perception also becomes the cause of definitive cognition and thereby becomes a factor in all activity. For instance, even though Sense-perception is ‘free from Conceptual Content’, yet, whenever it appears, it appears as qualifying, through the manifestation of its form in consciousness, the Thing perceived—like Fire, for instance—as differentiated from all other homogeneous and heterogeneous things;—and as this perception apprehends one definite thing with a well-defined form,—and is also accompanied by the idea of the thing as differentiated from other homogeneous and heterogeneous things,—it renders manifest, in that same thing, certain positive and negative concepts—such as ‘this is Fire’,—‘this is not a bunch of flowers’; as these two concepts are only indirectly related to the Thing concerned, they are not regarded as valid, even though they are in perfect accord with the real state of things; and the reason for this lies in the fact that it involves the unification of what is seen and what is conceived, and as such cannot be regarded as the apprehension of what is not already apprehended, (and hence valid).
It is for the reason stated above that the non-conceptual Perception, being the cause of the said two concepts, becomes the cause of the indication of a third kind of negation also. For instance, whenever a cognition appears in regard to anything, it envisages it because it bears its semblance; and as anything other than that thing is not perceived, it distinguishes the former thi ng from all else; in connection with all things, there are these two poles—what is perceived and what is other than the perceived; consequently it is indicated that there is no third alternative.
“If that is so, then, if the Subject,—Sound, for instance—has been apprehended by Perception itself, the inferential concept of non-eternality that appears in connection with it cannot be valid
That does not affect our position. Even though the Perception be brought about, yet that aspect of the thing alone is said to be ‘apprehended’ (by the Perception) in regard to which the resultant definite cognition is produced and which alone lends itself to activity; while that aspect in regard to which it is not able to produce a definite cognition, because of the operation of an imposition based on misconception,—even though such an aspect might be apprehended as fit for lending itself to activity,—it is regarded to be as good as not-apprehended; and it is in regard to this that, for the purpose of setting aside the said imposition, Inference becomes operative and hence valid;—no such validity can belong to the Conception that follows in the wake of the Sense-perception; as in the latter case, there is no setting aside of any imposition that has come in.
Question:—“What is the reason that, though the apprehension appears in regard to the form of the thing which is different from that of all other things, yet the resultant Idea is not certain and definite?”
Answer:—The reason lies in the fact that it is dependent upon other causes. Merely because a thing has been apprehended it does not follow that the Idea in regard to it is certain and definite; because it depends upon other causes, in the shape of repetition, the man’s interest, the vividness (of the original perception) and so forth. Just as, when one has the same person as his Father and Teacher, when he sees him coming, the definite idea in his mind is ‘My Father is coming’, not ‘my Teacher is coming’.—(1306)