आगमे विश्वासटिप्पन्यः

Original

न समारोपविच्छेदविषयत्वेन मानता ।
अनुमायाः प्रमाणत्वप्रसङ्गेन स्मृतेरपि ॥ १३०१ ॥
प्रत्यक्षानन्तरोद्भूतसमारोपणवारणात् ।
इष्टं तु लैङ्गिकं ज्ञानं प्रमाणं न तदस्ति ते ॥ १३०२ ॥
गौःशुक्लश्चलतीत्यादौ प्रत्यक्षानन्तरं न हि ।
समारोपोऽत्र विज्ञाने वेद्यते यन्निषिध्यते ॥ १३०३ ॥

na samāropavicchedaviṣayatvena mānatā |
anumāyāḥ pramāṇatvaprasaṅgena smṛterapi || 1301 ||
pratyakṣānantarodbhūtasamāropaṇavāraṇāt |
iṣṭaṃ tu laiṅgikaṃ jñānaṃ pramāṇaṃ na tadasti te || 1302 ||
gauḥśuklaścalatītyādau pratyakṣānantaraṃ na hi |
samāropo’tra vijñāne vedyate yanniṣidhyate || 1303 ||

As a matter of pact, the validity of inferential cognition does not rest upon its apprehending a thing differentiated from impositions; if that were so, then remembrance also would have to be regarded as valid. What really happens is that after the sense-perception (of a certain thing) there appear certain impositions (doubts and misconceptions), and it is by reason of setting aside these impositions that inferential-cognition has been regarded as valid.—This is not possible for you; because in the case of such cognitions as ‘the white—cow—walking’—after the sense-perception, no imposition is found to appear, which could be negatived (by the subsequent valid cognition).—(1301-1303)

Kamalaśīla

The validity of Inference lies in its precluding the imposition that has crept in, and not merely in precluding an imposition; in the latter case validity would attach to Remembrance also. In the case of the (initial non-con-ceptual) Perception being followed by the conceptual perception of the ‘white—cow—walking’, there is no preclusion of an imposition that has crept in, because no such imposition has actually come in.

“How do you know that it has not come in?”

Answer:—‘In the case of such cognitions, etc. etc.’;—when a Concept does come in, it does not remain uncognised; hence, being capable of being cognised, if the Imposition is not cognised, it follows that it has not come in at all.—(1301-1303)

All this has been said after taking it for granted that the Universal and the rest do exist. Now the Author proceeds to show that in reality, the

Universal and the rest do not exist at all, and hence the Perception apprehending them cannot be conceptual:—[see verses 1304-1305 next]