आगमे विश्वासटिप्पन्यः

Original

संमुग्धानेकसामान्यरूपेणाधिगमे सति ।
नैव चेन्निश्चितं वस्तु निश्चयस्तूत्तरोत्तरः ॥ १२९९ ॥
समारोपव्यवच्छेदविषयत्वाद्यथाऽनुमा ।
समारोपव्यवच्छेदविषयो निश्चयस्तथा ॥ १३०० ॥

saṃmugdhānekasāmānyarūpeṇādhigame sati |
naiva cenniścitaṃ vastu niścayastūttarottaraḥ || 1299 ||
samāropavyavacchedaviṣayatvādyathā’numā |
samāropavyavacchedaviṣayo niścayastathā || 1300 ||

(At the initial stage), there is only a vague idea of several universals, and there is no definite idea of anything; the definite idea comes only later; as this apprehends the thing as differentiated from all impositions (doubts and misconceptions). Just as inference apprehends the object as differentiated from impositions, so also does the (later) definite cognition.”—(1299-1300)

Kamalaśīla

[Says the Opponent]—“If the Reason adduced here is that “the Universal, etc. are already apprehended as differentiated from all imposition (Doubts and Misconceptions),—then it is one that is ‘not-admitted’; if it means that they are apprehended somehow, then it is Inconclusive, in view of the character of Inference”.

This is the argument that is set forth in the following—[see verses 1299-1300 above]

“At the first stage, the Thing is apprehended by Pre-cognition only in a vague, not in the well-defined form; the well-defined cognition comes only

later, and this is valid, as it apprehends the Thing as differentiated from impo_ sitîons,—like Inference. For instance, after the subject, Sound, has been apprehended by Perception, there appears, through the fact of its being a product, the well-defined (inferential) idea that it is non-eternal; and this subsequent Inferential Cognition of the non-eternality of sound is valid; in the same manner the subsequent Perceptional Cognition becomes well-defined when it apprehends the thing as differentiated from impositions. On this point of well-defined cognition apprehending things differentiated from imposition, you also do not hold a different opinion; as is clear from your assertion to the following effect—‘Between well-defined cognition and imposed cognition subsists the relation of the annuller and the annulled; and it is understood that the well-defined cognition becomes operative on the thing being differentiated from impositions’.”—(1299-1300)

The answer to the above is as follows:—[see verses 1301-1303 next]