Original
विशेषात्मातिरेकेण नापरं भेदलक्षणम् ।
तद्रूपास्पर्शने तेषु ग्रहणं कथमुच्यते ॥ १२८० ॥
तद्रूपस्पर्शने चापि भेदान्तरविभेदिनः ।
गृहीता इति विज्ञानं प्राप्तमेषु विकल्पकम् ॥ १२८१ ॥viśeṣātmātirekeṇa nāparaṃ bhedalakṣaṇam |
tadrūpāsparśane teṣu grahaṇaṃ kathamucyate || 1280 ||
tadrūpasparśane cāpi bhedāntaravibhedinaḥ |
gṛhītā iti vijñānaṃ prāptameṣu vikalpakam || 1281 ||Of the particular things there is no other characteristic except that of being ‘particular’ (or ‘distinct’); how then can there be any apprehension of them which does not envisage the ‘distinct’ form? Even if their forms are envisaged, they are apprehended only as distinct from other particulars; so that their perception would be ‘conceptual’.—(1280-1283)
Kamalaśīla
There is no ‘Particular’ apart from the various Things. If then, the Particular were not envisaged in the apprehension of the Uni versa’, how could the various Things be apprehended? That is to say, being non-different from the nature of what is not apprehended, the Particulars also would be not -apprehended.
If it be held that the various Things are apprehended,—then, if these forms are envisaged,—and are apprehended,—the Particular also would be apprehended, being, as it is, non-different from what has been apprehended. So that, in regard to these various things, the Cognition that is held to be apprehensive of the Universal turns out to be conceptual.—(1280-1281)