0907 Verse 1261-1263

Original

नामपि वाचकं नैव यच्छब्दस्य स्वलक्षणम् ।
स्वलक्षणस्य वाच्यत्ववाचकत्वे हि दूषिते ॥ १२६१ ॥
अध्यारोपितमेवातो वाच्यवाचकमिष्यते ।
अनारोपितमर्थं च प्रत्यक्षं प्रतिपद्यते ॥ १२६२ ॥
स्वलक्षणस्य सद्भावे सद्भावात्तदभावतः ।
व्यवधानादिभावे च तस्यापि व्यतिरेकतः ॥ १२६३ ॥

nāmapi vācakaṃ naiva yacchabdasya svalakṣaṇam |
svalakṣaṇasya vācyatvavācakatve hi dūṣite || 1261 ||
adhyāropitamevāto vācyavācakamiṣyate |
anāropitamarthaṃ ca pratyakṣaṃ pratipadyate || 1262 ||
svalakṣaṇasya sadbhāve sadbhāvāttadabhāvataḥ |
vyavadhānādibhāve ca tasyāpi vyatirekataḥ || 1263 ||

The name also, which would be the ‘specific individuality’ of the word, can never be denotative; as the idea of the ‘specific individuality’ being the denotes or the denoted has been already rejected.—It is for this reason that the idea of the denoter and denoted has been regarded as something superimposed (upon things);—while what one apprehends by sense-perception is something which is not superimposed; because this perception is there only when the ‘specific individuality’ is there,—and it is not there when the specific individuality is not there—through the intervention of something else or some such reason.—(1261-1263)

Kamalaśīla

It might be argued that—“There may be no qualifying Properties in the shape of the Universal and the rest; the form of the word itself will be the distinguishing property.”

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verses 1261-1263 above]

There can be no Convention in regard to the ‘Specific Individuality’,—not even to the ‘Specific Individuality’ of the Word; for the simple reason that there can be no connection with Convention at the time of usage; and apart from its ‘Specific Individuality’, there is no other form of the Word; nor again can the Word be connected with anything with regard to which there has been no Convention; if it did, it would lead to absurdities nor can there be any Conceptual Content without connection with words;—from all this it follows that the whole idea of the Denoter and Denoted is something ‘superimposed’—imaginary—not real.

It might be argued that—“even so, the Perception shall become associated with Conceptual Content (Determinate) through apprehending the ‘superimposed’ thing.”

The answer is that ‘what one apprehends, etc. etc.’

‘When it is not there’,—i.e. through its absence,—the word ‘vyatirekataḥ’ being construed here; the sense being that ‘it is through the absence of the Specific Individuality (that the Perception also is absent)

Question:—“When is there absence of the Specific Individuality?”

Answer:—‘Through the intervention, etc. etc.’—The term ‘some such reason’ stands for the distance of time, place and so forth.—(1261-1263)

The following Text adduces another proof for the same:—[see verse 1264 next]