0896 Verse 1239-1242

Original

एवं प्रतीतरूपा च यदेवं कल्पना मता ।
तादात्म्यप्रतिषेधश्च प्रत्यक्षस्योपवर्ण्यते ॥ १२३९ ॥
तदाऽध्यक्षादिशब्देन वाच्यत्वेऽपि न बाध्यते ।
कल्पनाविरहोऽध्यक्षे न हि सा शब्दवाच्यता ॥ १२४० ॥
अन्यथा रूपगन्धादेः सविकल्पकता भवेत् ।
अतो नास्पदमेवेदं यदाहुः कुधियः परे ॥ १२४१ ॥
यदि प्रत्यक्षशब्देन प्रत्यक्षमभिधीयते ।
कथं तत्कल्पनापोढमयुक्तं गम्यते कथम् ॥ १२४२ ॥

evaṃ pratītarūpā ca yadevaṃ kalpanā matā |
tādātmyapratiṣedhaśca pratyakṣasyopavarṇyate || 1239 ||
tadā’dhyakṣādiśabdena vācyatve’pi na bādhyate |
kalpanāviraho’dhyakṣe na hi sā śabdavācyatā || 1240 ||
anyathā rūpagandhādeḥ savikalpakatā bhavet |
ato nāspadamevedaṃ yadāhuḥ kudhiyaḥ pare || 1241 ||
yadi pratyakṣaśabdena pratyakṣamabhidhīyate |
kathaṃ tatkalpanāpoḍhamayuktaṃ gamyate katham || 1242 ||

Conceptual content being held to be as actually understood and described above, it is the denial of the sameness of this with sense-perception that has been asserted; and this is not inconsistent with the fact of its being spoken of by such words as ‘adhyakṣa’ (‘pratyakṣa’) and the like. In sense-perception there is absence of conceptual content, but ‘conceptual content’ is not the same as ‘expressed by words otherwise, colour, odour and the rest would become determinate (as they are ‘expressed by words’).—Thus there is no room for what the dull-witted persons have urged.—If the word ‘sense-perception’ actually denotes sense-perception, then how can its being said to be ‘free from conceptual content’ be held to be improper?—(1239-1242)

Kamalaśīla

Objection:—“If Conceptual Content is ‘Idea associated with words’, then it is something having properties, an object; it is not likely for one object to belong to another object, in view of which its negation or denial could be brought about as a property of it; hence what is asserted is most incoherent. Thus if Sense-perception is ‘free from conceptual content’, then how is it spoken of by the word ‘Sense-perception’?”

This is the objection that is urged by Bharga, Bhāradvāja and others, who think that the term ‘free from Conceptual Content’ is synonymous with ‘inexpressible by words’,

The Author says that this objection has been answered already:—[see verses 1239-1242 above]

‘Denial of the sameness’;—when Diṅnāga says that ‘where there is no Conceptual Content, that is Sense-perception’ what he does is to deny the sameness of the two; the meaning being [that Sense-perception is] that Cognition which is not of the nature of the said Conceptual Content;—it does not deny what is contained in the ‘content This disposes of the first objection.

The second objection also is not proper; because ‘freedom from Conceptual Content’ is not ‘inexpressibility by words’, it is only ‘freedom determining concepts Even though the Cognition is non-determinate, yet it is regarded as expressed by words, by reason of its being actually found to be so expressed; and yet it does not become ‘determinate, being, in this respect, like Colour and other, things (which, though expressed by words, do not become determinate on that account). This is only by the way.—(1239-1242)