0891 Verse 1230-1233

Original

जात्यादियोजनां येऽपि कल्पनां समुपाश्रिताः ।
तैरभ्युपेया नियतं प्रतीतिरभिलापिनी ॥ १२३० ॥
अन्यथा योजनाभावाद्युक्तयोरिव भावयोः ।
स्वातन्त्र्येण परिच्छेदात्कल्पना नैव कल्प्यते ॥ १२३१ ॥
एवं वा व्यवहार्यं स्यात्सर्वं विश्वमिदं ततः ।
जात्यादिरूपसंसृष्टं व्यवहार्यमिदं मतम् ॥ १२३२ ॥
जात्यादियोजना शब्दयोजनाऽव्यभिचारिणी ।
एवं चोच्यत इत्येतत्फलवज्जायते वचः ॥ १२३३ ॥

jātyādiyojanāṃ ye’pi kalpanāṃ samupāśritāḥ |
tairabhyupeyā niyataṃ pratītirabhilāpinī || 1230 ||
anyathā yojanābhāvādyuktayoriva bhāvayoḥ |
svātantryeṇa paricchedātkalpanā naiva kalpyate || 1231 ||
evaṃ vā vyavahāryaṃ syātsarvaṃ viśvamidaṃ tataḥ |
jātyādirūpasaṃsṛṣṭaṃ vyavahāryamidaṃ matam || 1232 ||
jātyādiyojanā śabdayojanā’vyabhicāriṇī |
evaṃ cocyata ityetatphalavajjāyate vacaḥ || 1233 ||

Even those who are wedded to the notion that conceptual content consists in ‘connection with the universal and the rest’, have to admit that it is ‘idea associated with words’.—Otherwise, just as the two connected things are non-existent, so their connection also would be non-existent,—all things being conceived severally each by itself; and there would be no need for postulating the ‘conceptual content and the result of this would be that there would be no usage in the world; because usage has been regarded as associated with the universal and the rest,—and association with the universal and the rest is inseparable from association with words. thus alone could the expression ‘spoken of’ used by the teacher be fruitful.—(1230-1233)

Kamalaśīla

It is not only we who regard the Conceptual Content as ‘Idea associated with words’; in fact, others also have got to accept it as such; otherwise there would be no usage in the world.—This is what is shown in the following—[see verses 1230-1233 above]

Even when Conceptual Content is regarded by others as ‘association with Universal, Quality, Action and Substance’,—in reality ‘association’ with Name alone constitutes the Conceptual Content. Because as a matter of fact, whenever a thing is apprehended as distinguished by the Universal, etc. it is so only through the Name; if it were not so, then—like the apprehension of several distinct things, there being connection independently by itself,—how could there be any ‘Conceptual Content’? And the result of this would be that the world would become dumb.—It is for this reason that even on seeing the man with the stick, one does not connect the various factors implied in the notion of the ‘stick-holder’, until he recalls the particular Name.

Just because all such connection is invariably concomitant with the association of words, the words of the Teacher—to the effect that ‘what is spoken of in the case of words like ‘Cow’ is the thing qualified by the Universal’—become fruitful (have some sense). Otherwise, without the Name, how could the (passive) term ‘is spoken of’ be used?—As the action of speaking (expressing) belongs to the word.—(1230-1233)