0869 Verse 1208-1209

Original

ननु चापोहपक्षेऽपि कथं सङ्केतसम्भवः ।
साफल्यं च कथं तस्य न द्वयोः स हि सिद्ध्यति ॥ १२०८ ॥
वक्तृश्रोत्रोर्न हि ज्ञानं वेद्यते तत्परस्परम् ।
सङ्केते न च तद्दृष्टं व्यवहारे समीक्ष्यते ॥ १२०९ ॥

nanu cāpohapakṣe’pi kathaṃ saṅketasambhavaḥ |
sāphalyaṃ ca kathaṃ tasya na dvayoḥ sa hi siddhyati || 1208 ||
vaktṛśrotrorna hi jñānaṃ vedyate tatparasparam |
saṅkete na ca taddṛṣṭaṃ vyavahāre samīkṣyate || 1209 ||

“Under the theory of Apoha also, how is convention possible?—How too is it fruitful?—When it cannot be known to both, the speaker and the listener; as the idea of one cannot be known to the other. what too was seen at the time of the making of the convention is not seen at the time of the use of the word.”—(1208-1209)

Kamalaśīla

“Just as, in the case of Specific Individuality and the rest, there is impossibility of Convention and Futility, so it would be also in the case of Apoha; so that, inasmuch as there would be no Convention made, the denotation by words of the Apoha alone cannot be right; hence the Reason adduced is Inconclusive.

“How too is it fruitful?—That is, how is fruitfulness possible—‘Tasya’—stands for the Convention.

Question:—Why is Convention not possible in this case?

“Answer:—Because it cannot be known to both.—The term ‘hi’ denotes reason; the meaning being—Became the Apoha in the shape of Reflection cannot be one and the same, as the object of Convention, for both, the Speaker and the Listener.

Why?

“Because the Idea of one, etc. etc.;—people of limited vision are cognisant of only their own ideas; no one with limited vision can be cognisant of the idea in another’s mind; and in reality the Apoha in the form of Reflection is nothing different from Idea (Cognition); so that as between the Speaker and the Listener, what would be known as the subject of a Convention could not be known to the other; hence wherein could the Convention be made or comprehended? Unless the Speaker knows the thing, he cannot make any Convention relating to it; nor can the Listener comprehend it. If he did, it would lead to absurdities. For instance, the Reflection of the object, which is what the Speaker cognises as figuring in his cognition, is not cognised by the Listener; and what is cognised by the Listener is not cognised by the Speaker; as every man is cognisant only of what appears to himself.

“The futility of Convention is next shown—‘What too, etc. etc.’—The Reflection that was apprehended at the time of the making of the Convention, by the Listener or by the Speaker, is not apprehended at the time of the use of the word; as the former, being in a perpetual flux, has long ceased to existence; and that which is apprehended at the time of the use of the word was not seen at the time of the making of the Convention; as what was apprehended at that time was something entirely different. And it is not right that usage should be based upon a Convention that rests upon something different; as such usage would lead to absurdities,”—(1208-1209)

This argument is answered in the following—[see verses 1210 above]