0849 Verse 1176-1178

Original

प्रमेयज्ञेयशब्दादेः प्रतियत्तिनिमित्तताम् ।
इत्थं वाक्यस्थितस्यैव दृष्ट्वा कालान्तरेष्वपि ॥ ११७६ ॥
केवलस्योपलम्भे या प्रतीतिरुपजायते ।
प्लवमानार्थभेदेषु सा तद्वाक्यानुसारतः ॥ ११७७ ॥
घटादिभ्योऽपि शब्देभ्यः साऽस्त्येव च तथाविधा ।
तस्माद्धटादिशब्देन ज्ञेयादिध्वनयः समाः ॥ ११७८ ॥

prameyajñeyaśabdādeḥ pratiyattinimittatām |
itthaṃ vākyasthitasyaiva dṛṣṭvā kālāntareṣvapi || 1176 ||
kevalasyopalambhe yā pratītirupajāyate |
plavamānārthabhedeṣu sā tadvākyānusārataḥ || 1177 ||
ghaṭādibhyo’pi śabdebhyaḥ sā’styeva ca tathāvidhā |
tasmāddhaṭādiśabdena jñeyādidhvanayaḥ samāḥ || 1178 ||

That words like ‘knowable’, ‘cognisable’ serve as the means of producing cognitions (ideas) having been perceived only when they appear in a sentence,—if, at some other time? They are found to be used alone by themselves, the idea that is produced by them, in regard to things that are nebulous, is in accordance with what has been found in the case of their use in a sentence.—In fact, in the case of words like ‘jar’ also, it is the same; so that the words ‘knowable’ and the like are just like the words ‘jar’ and the rest.—(1176-1178)

Kamalaśīla

Says the Opponent:—“Are Words cognisable as evanescent (non-eternal), or not?—When this doubt is raised, and the answer is—‘cognisable’;—if the man who is ignorant of the context in which the word ‘cognisable’ has been uttered, hears only the word ‘cognisable’, there does appear in him some sort of a cognition of a nebulous character.—If then the word cognisable’ by itself (apart from a sentence) had no denotation, then how is there the said cognition that is expressed by it?”

Answer:—[see verses 1176-1178 above]

What the whole of this means is as follows;—As a matter of fact, there is no Cognition following from the hearing of the word (‘cognisable’) by itself; what happens in such cases is that the man has previously heard the word used in a sentence as conveying a definite meaning,—so that when he subsequently hears it pronounced alone by itself, he has his mind influenced by the similarity of the word in the two cases, and he comes to presume that he has understood its meaning. That this is so is shown by the fact that under this latter presumption, the nebulous and wavering idea that the listener has is of those same things which he cognised on previous occasions, when the word was used in sentences. This is exactly the same as in the case of the ordinary words like ‘Jar’.—For instance, the question having been put—‘Shall I bring water in a Jar or in the Hands?—The answer is ‘In the Jar’; if the man who hears this last word alone is ignorant of the context in which it has been uttered,—the idea that he has is in accordance with the meaning of the word ‘Jar’ that he had understood in those previous sentences that he had heard with that word in them.

Thus then it follows that words like ‘cognisable’ are just as denotative of particularngs as other denotative words. This is what is pointed out in the Text by the words—‘So that, etc. etc.’,—(1176-1178)