आगमे विश्वासटिप्पन्यः

Original

अगोनिवृत्तिरन्यत्वं तस्य चात्मगतैव सा ।
भेदोक्तावप्यभावस्तु केवलो न निवर्त्तते ॥ १०७५ ॥
तद्विशेषणभावेऽपि वस्तुधीर्न विहीयते ।
कल्पनानिर्मितं चेदमभेदेऽपि विशेषणम् ॥ १०७६ ॥
सोपकृष्य ततो धर्मः स्थापितो भेदवानिव ।
येन दण्डादिवत्तस्य जायते हि विशेषणम् ॥ १०७७ ॥

agonivṛttiranyatvaṃ tasya cātmagataiva sā |
bhedoktāvapyabhāvastu kevalo na nivarttate || 1075 ||
tadviśeṣaṇabhāve’pi vastudhīrna vihīyate |
kalpanānirmitaṃ cedamabhede’pi viśeṣaṇam || 1076 ||
sopakṛṣya tato dharmaḥ sthāpito bhedavāniva |
yena daṇḍādivattasya jāyate hi viśeṣaṇam || 1077 ||

What is meant by (the cow) being ‘different’ is only the ‘exclusion of the non-cow’; and this exclusion is of the nature of that same difference.—Even when the difference has been asserted, the thing itself does not entirely disappear. Thus even when it has the nature of the qualification, the cognition of the thing does not cease. even when there is non-difference, the qualification is there as a creation of fancy. That character, having been withdrawn therefrom, has been placed there as if different; whereby it becomes its qualification, like the stick and other things.—(1075-1077)

Kamalaśīla

It has been argued above (under Text, 949, by Kumārila) that—“one land of qualification cannot bring about the cognition of a different kind, etc. etc.”.—This is answered in the following—[see verses 1075-1077 above]

If the ‘exclusion of other things’ were meant to be something positive qualifying the Thing, then all the objections urged would be applicable. As a matter of fact, however, the ‘exclusion of other things’ which is held to be the qualification is in the form of the thing itself; so that the notion of the qualified is naturally in accord with that of the qualification. For instance, when one speaks of the ‘exclusion’ of the Cow ‘from the non-Cow’, this ‘exclusion’ is only of the nature of the ‘difference of the Cow from the Horse and other things’,—not anything else.—Hence, even though the exclusion, of the Cow, from the non-Cow, is mentioned in the negative form, when all that is meant is the negation of other things,—yet in reality, it forms the very essence of the Cow itself,—just like the ‘difference’; that is, ‘difference’ is not anything different from the different thing,—it is that same; otherwise that thing could not figure in the ‘difference’ at all.

‘Tat’—i.e. thus—even when the ‘exclusion of others’ is of the nature of the qualification, the idea of the ‘Thing’ itself does appear in regard to what is qualified by that qualification.

It might be argued as follows “In ordinary life the qualification is known to be something different from the qualified, as the stick of the Man (stick-holder); and ‘Exclusion’ is (as you say) not different from the Thing; how then can this Exclusion be the qualification of the Thing?”

The answer is—‘Even when there is non-difference, etc. etc.’.—In reality, nothing can be qualified by anything; because what does not accord any help cannot be a qualification;—if the according of help be admitted, then, in cases where the Cause may not exist at the time of the coming about of the effect, there could be no relation of qualification and qualified between the two things not existing at the same time;—while in the case of both existing at the same time, as the things would be already there in their accomplished forms, there would be no mutual help; and hence there could be no relation of qualification and qualified. Consequently, in the case of all things, what happens is that, though each of them stands separately, on its own footing, like so many iron-bars,—yet there is a jumbling up of them as a creation of fancy.

Thus then, though, in reality, there is no difference between the ‘Exclusion’ and that wherein the Exclusion subsists, yet, on the basis of an imaginary difference, there would be the relation of qualification and qualified between them.—(1075-1077)