Original
गावोऽगावश्च संसिद्धा भिन्नप्रत्यवमर्शतः ।
शब्दस्तु केवलोऽसिद्धो यथेष्टं संप्रयुज्यते ॥ १०६४ ॥
न ह्यन्यग्रहणं वस्तु भिन्नं वित्तावपेक्षते ।
अन्योन्याश्रयदोषोऽयं तस्मादस्मिन्निरास्पदः ॥ १०६५ ॥gāvo’gāvaśca saṃsiddhā bhinnapratyavamarśataḥ |
śabdastu kevalo’siddho yatheṣṭaṃ saṃprayujyate || 1064 ||
na hyanyagrahaṇaṃ vastu bhinnaṃ vittāvapekṣate |
anyonyāśrayadoṣo’yaṃ tasmādasminnirāspadaḥ || 1065 ||The cow and the non-cow are both well-established,—as there are distinct determinate judgments in regard to both; it is only the word that is not well-established; and hence it is applied according to the speaker’s whim.—As a matter of fact, a distinct thing does not need for its apprehension, the apprehension of another thing; hence there is no room here for the charge of ‘mutual interdependence’.—(1063-1065)
Kamalaśīla
It has been argued above (under Texts, 943-944, by Kumārila) that—“It is only the well-established non-Cow that could be excluded, and it is of the nature of the negation of the Cow, etc. etc.”.
The answer to this is as follows:—[see verses 1064-1065 above]
As a matter of fact, things like the Cow, by themselves, bring about distinct determinate judgments regarding themselves, and as such, are well- known in their distinct forms. For the purpose of speaking of them, people make use of words, which are not well known, through their whims. Under the circumstances, if the form of a distinct thing required, for its own apprehension, the apprehension of another different thing,—then there might have been mutual interdependence. As a matter of fact, however, the distinct thing is apprehended without the apprehension of another thing; and when it is definitely known as something distinct bringing about a distinct determinate judgment,—and then the Convention is made in the form ‘this is a Cow’, ‘that is a Cow’ and so forth,—according to the man’s wish,—how then, can there be any mutual interdependence?
‘Vittau’—stands for ‘vittyartham’, for the apprehension.—(1064-1065)