Original
यो वाऽर्थो बुद्धिविषयो बाह्यवस्तुनिबन्धनः ।
स बाह्यं वस्त्विति ज्ञातः शब्दार्थः कैश्चिदिष्यते ॥ ८९१ ॥yo vā’rtho buddhiviṣayo bāhyavastunibandhanaḥ |
sa bāhyaṃ vastviti jñātaḥ śabdārthaḥ kaiścidiṣyate || 891 ||When an object forms the content of the idea, on the basis of an external object,—and it comes to be cognised as ‘an external object’; this (mixture of idea—object) has been regarded by some people as forming the ‘import of words’.—(891)
Kamalaśīla
(e) Others have held the following view:—“When the form of an external object is impinged upon the Idea, and is apprehended as an external object, it becomes manifested in the form of the Idea; and it is this Idea that is denoted by Words”. This is the view set forth in the following.—[see verse 891 above]
‘Content of the Idea’,—i.e. revolving in the Idea, subsisting in the Idea.
‘On the basis of an external object’;—i.e. that for the manifesting of whose form recourse is had to the real-unreal external thing,—in the shape of the letter-symbols.
‘It comes to be cognised as an external object’;—i.e. manifested in the form of the Idea, but apprehended as something external. That is to say, so long as the form of the Idea is not impinged upon the objects and is cognised, on due consideration, as Idea itself,—it is not recognised as forming the import of words; because what is purely subjective can have no connection with any form of activity; for instance, actions spoken of in such words as
‘Bring the Cow’, ‘Eat the Curd’, are not possible for the mere Idea; and what words denote is a thing capable of action; hence what is apprehended as an Idea cannot be denoted by words. When, however, the form of the Idea becomes impinged upon the external object, the observer becomes influenced by its external character and comes to regard it as capable of action, and thus it becomes denoted by words.
Question:—“What is the difference between this theory and the theory of ‘Apoha’? The upholder of ‘Apoha’ also asserts that what is denoted by the word is the form of the Idea apprehended as something external: as has been declared in the following passage:—‘There is nothing incongruous in the statement that that object forms the Import of words which follows from the impinging of the form of the Idea and the cognisance of the exclusion of other things’.”
This is not right. The upholder of the Theory of the Idea-form being impinged upon things holds that what is denoted by the word is what has a real existence in the form of the Idea, and is impinged upon Substance and other things, which also are real,—and which therefore along with its object is not false or wrong; and he does not admit that the said idea is without real basis, and rests entirely on the imposition of non-difference upon things that are different, and is, on that account, false (wrong), and dependent entirely upon mutual exclusion among things [as held by the upholders of Apoha],—If the upholder of the Theory under review really held the view held by us and expressed in the following declaration—‘all this apprehension of things as one is a false notion,—its basis lies in mutual exclusion, which is what is expressed by the name’,—then his argument would be entirely superfluous [as what he would be seeking to prove would be what is already admitted by us]. This is what is going to be asserted later on in the passage—‘If the basis of this lies in mutual exclusion, then that is exactly our view’,—As for the Apohist, on the other hand, he does not hold anything denoted by words, or the form of the Idea, to be real. Because what he holds is that that alone forms the Import of the word which appears to be apprehended by the verbal cognition; and (under the Theory under review) what is apprehended by the verbal cognition is not the form of the Idea, but the external object which is capable of effective action,—And yet the external object is not really apprehended by it,—because the apprehension is not in strict accordance with the real state of things; on the contrary the thing is accepted in accordance with the apprehension; so that the Import of words is something that is superimposed; and what is superimposed is nothing; so in reality, nothing is denoted by words.—As for what has been said by the Apohist (in the passage quoted by the other party in line 21 on the preceding page of the Text) regarding ‘that being the denotation of words’,—that has been said with a view to the superimposed object. The upholder of the Theory however, regards the form of the Idea to be really denoted by words. Thus there is a great difference between the two theories.—(891)