Original
नचानुयायि तेष्विष्टमन्यत्सत्त्वं यदीष्यते ।
न षडर्थातिरेकेण जायन्तेऽभावबुद्धयः ॥ ७८८ ॥nacānuyāyi teṣviṣṭamanyatsattvaṃ yadīṣyate |
na ṣaḍarthātirekeṇa jāyante’bhāvabuddhayaḥ || 788 ||Nor is it held that the single all-embracing universal ‘being’ subsists in them all. because notions of ‘negation’ do not appear apart from the six categories.—(788)
Kamalaśīla
It might be argued that—“there is one all-embracing Universal everywhere”;—the answer to that is as follows—[see verse 788 above]
There is no one Universal embracing several such heterogeneous things as the Cloth and the like,—upon which the notion in question could be based.—It might be argued that—“there is the Great Universal (the Summum Genus) called ‘Being’, and the notion of Negation would arise on the basis of that—That however cannot be right; as it is not true; that is to say, you have such notions of Negation as are involved—(a) in the denial of suchngs as ‘Dissociation from Impurities’ [‘Pratisaṅkhyānirodha’, a technicality postulated by the Bauddha, but denied by his opponents] as apart from the six Categories,—and (b) in the true denial of such imaginary characters in stories like Kapiñjala;—to which adjunct would such notions of ‘Negation’ be due, which could be regarded as their basis? Surely according to your view there is no real ‘Being’ (existence) in the case of such things as the said ‘Dissociation from Impurities’ and the like.
This same argument answers also the following assertion of Kumārila’s:—“If it be urged that ‘in the case of Prior Negation, etc. there is no Universal posited’,—the answer is that Being itself is the Universal in these, as qualified by non-appearance” [Ślokavārtika-Apohavāda, 11]; where the last qualification means that the ‘Being’ that subsists in the Negations is qualified by the character of being not-produced.
The objection that we have urged above applies to this view also. Because there can be no ‘Being’ (Existence, Reality) in thengs postulated under other systems, or in character andngs created in imaginary tales, etc.,—on which basis the notion of ‘Negation’ could arise in regard to them.
“What is conceived in the case of these things is the imaginary ‘Being’, which has no counter-part reality in the external world.”
If that is so, then why is not the denotation of all terms admitted to consist in mere fancy, entirely devoid of any single permanent Universal in the shape of ‘Being’? Otherwise, if a Universal in the shape of the one eternal ‘Being’ be postulated,—inasmuch as all such terms as ‘Being’, ‘Man’ and the like would equally connote only the ‘exclusion of other things’, why should there be divergent notions regarding these?—There can be no answer to this objection.—(788)