आगमे विश्वासटिप्पन्यः

Original

घटत्वादि च सामान्यं घटादावेव वर्त्तते ।
नाभावेष्वस्य वृत्तिस्तु तस्मात्तेषु कथं नु धीः ॥ ७८० ॥
नाश्रयान्तरवृत्ताद्धि युक्तावन्यत्र धीध्वनी ।
हस्तित्वादि न कर्कादावत्रैकार्थाश्रयोऽपि न ॥ ७८१ ॥
रसः शीतो गुरुश्चेति स्यादेकार्थाश्रयान्मतिः ।
इहायमपि नैवास्ति नाभावो वर्तते क्वचित् ॥ ७८२ ॥

ghaṭatvādi ca sāmānyaṃ ghaṭādāveva varttate |
nābhāveṣvasya vṛttistu tasmātteṣu kathaṃ nu dhīḥ || 780 ||
nāśrayāntaravṛttāddhi yuktāvanyatra dhīdhvanī |
hastitvādi na karkādāvatraikārthāśrayo’pi na || 781 ||
rasaḥ śīto guruśceti syādekārthāśrayānmatiḥ |
ihāyamapi naivāsti nābhāvo vartate kvacit || 782 ||

Universals called ‘jar’ and the rest subsist only in the jar; they cannot subsist in negations; how then does the comprehensive notion (of negation) arise in regard to these latter?—The (comprehensive) notion and name cannot be applied to one thing on the basis of what subsists in something else; for instance, the notion and name ‘cancer’ cannot be based upon the universal ‘elephant’. as a matter of fact, even ‘subsistence in one and the same thing’ is not present here. Notions of taste, colour, and heaviness might arise from their ‘subsistence in one and the same thing’; in the case in question (of negation) however, even this subsistence is not there; for the simple reason that negation does not subsist in anything at all.—(780-782)

Kamalaśīla

So far the author has explained the Reason ‘Because there is disparity’ [put forward, by himself under Text 768, against the opponent’s explanation of the comprehensive notion of ‘Negation’ in regard to the several kinds of Negation]. He next proceeds to explain the other Reason ‘Because it cannot rest upon that’:—[see verses 780-782 above]

As a matter of fact, the ‘Universal’ subsists only in the Jar and such entities, never in Negations, because these latter are non-entities. How then could there appear, in regard to these Negations, any comprehensive notion associated with the form of a Universal, on the basis of the ‘Universal’ Jar which subsists in something other (than the Negations)? For instance, the ‘Elephant’ does not become the basis of a comprehensive notion regarding the Cancer.

“But a notion is actually’ found to appear in connection with one thing on the basis of something that subsists elsewhere; e.g. such notions as ‘the sweet Taste is viscid, cool and heavy

This is answered in the words—‘Even subsistence in one and the same thing, etc., etc.’:—In the example cited, the qualities of ‘Coolness’ and the rest subsist in that same substance wherein the sweetness subsists; so that on the strength of this ‘subsistence in the same substratum’, there is coexistence; while Negation never subsists in any substance along with Universals like the ‘Jar’; for the simple reason that that which has no colour and form cannot subsist in anything.—(780-782)

The following Text anticipates the answer given by Uddyotakara—[see verses 783-784 next]