0566 Verse 757-760

Original

दण्डाङ्गदादिजातीनामेकदा न हि लक्षणे ।
तद्वियोगेऽपि दण्ड्यादिमतिस्तेषु प्रवर्त्तते ॥ ७५७ ॥
अथापि पाचकत्वादिजातिरन्यैव वर्त्तते ।
सद्योजातेऽपि तद्योगात्पाचकादिमतिर्भवेत् ॥ ७५८ ॥
सदादिमतिवन्नो चेत्तदा सा समवायिनी ।
पश्चादपि न सा तत्र तथा स्यादविशेषतः ॥ ७५९ ॥
तत्सम्बद्धस्वभावस्य वैगुण्यान्न तयोरसौ ।
समवायस्तथा पश्चात्तादात्म्ये च कथं भवेत् ॥ ७६० ॥

daṇḍāṅgadādijātīnāmekadā na hi lakṣaṇe |
tadviyoge’pi daṇḍyādimatisteṣu pravarttate || 757 ||
athāpi pācakatvādijātiranyaiva varttate |
sadyojāte’pi tadyogātpācakādimatirbhavet || 758 ||
sadādimativanno cettadā sā samavāyinī |
paścādapi na sā tatra tathā syādaviśeṣataḥ || 759 ||
tatsambaddhasvabhāvasya vaiguṇyānna tayorasau |
samavāyastathā paścāttādātmye ca kathaṃ bhavet || 760 ||

In the case of such ‘universals’ as the ‘stick’, the ‘armlet’ and the like, even though they have been indicated and perceived once (in one person),—the idea of the ‘man with the stick’ (or ‘the man with the armlet’) does not continue on the removal of the stick or armlet.—If the ‘universal’ cook were something entirely different (from the individual persons), then (as a permanent entity) it should be present in the new-born child also, who also could be conceived of as a ‘cook—if it be held that, like the idea of ‘being’ (existence), it does not subsist in a certain substratum (the child just born f.i.),—then, later on, also it could not subsist in it; as the conditions would be the same.—It may be that at the initial stage (when the child is just born) there is no inherence between the two (the universal and the particular) because of the defective character of their relationship. But if so, then, how could there be that inherence, even afterwards, when the defect would still be there?—(757-760)

Kamalaśīla

There would be many absurdities. For instance, such ‘Universals’ as ‘Stick’ and the like having been perceived once,—when Devadatta had given up the Stick, the idea of his being ‘with Stick’, or ‘with the Ear-ring’, would be there.

Nor is it right to say that even in the man who has given up cooking, the ‘Universal’ Cook is present; because, the ‘Universal’ being eternal, it would be present in the new-born child also.

The Opponent might argue thus:—“The idea of ‘being existent’, though due to the ‘Universal Being’ (Existence), does not come about always; in the same way, the ‘Universal’ Cook also, being inherent in a certain particular substratum, would not appear at all times; so that it would not inhere in the new-born child.—‘Inhering’ is mentioned only by way of illustration; the ‘Universal’ would not be manifested;—this also has to be understood”.

But in that way, it comes to this that it may not inhere in it at all. Because the non-inherence of the ‘Universal’ in the new-born child, at the earlier stage, could be due only to some defect in the character of the relation between the ‘Universal’ and the Particular Object; and this defect would be present there at the later stages also;—how then could the ‘Universal’ inhere in it at all? According to your view, the Object is not momentary,—by which at the subsequent stages the Object (Child) would be a different entity.

‘That’—i.e. inherence.

‘Their relationship’—i.e. the relation between the ‘Universal’ and the Particular Object.

‘Tādātmye’,—i.e. the previous defective form not having been abandoned.—(757-760)

Even when the Object is admitted to be evanescent, the objection stated remains in force;—this is what is shown in the following—[see verse 761 next]