Original
पाचकादिषु च ज्ञानं विशिष्टमुपजायते ।
अभावेऽभावबुद्धिश्च विनैकेनानुगामिना ॥ ७४८ ॥
इच्छारचितरूपेषु नष्टाजातेषु वा ततः ।
अनैकान्तिकता हेतोः सर्वैरेभिर्यथोदितैः ॥ ७४९ ॥pācakādiṣu ca jñānaṃ viśiṣṭamupajāyate |
abhāve’bhāvabuddhiśca vinaikenānugāminā || 748 ||
icchāracitarūpeṣu naṣṭājāteṣu vā tataḥ |
anaikāntikatā hetoḥ sarvairebhiryathoditaiḥ || 749 ||Without any all-embracing basis, there is—(a) a particular cognition in regard to the ‘cook’; (b) similarly there is the notion of ‘negation’ in regard to negation itself; as also (c) in regard to persons and things created by imagination, and (d) in regard to dead and unborn persons.—In view of all these cognitions, the reason becomes open to the fallacy of ‘fallibility’.—(748-749)
Kamalaśīla
The following Text points out the ‘Fallibility’ of the Opponent’s Reason in another manner:—[see verses 748-749 above]
In the case of the notion of the ‘Cook’, the ‘Teacher’ and the like, there are no such all-embracing bases as the character of being Cook, the character of being the Teacher and so forth, on which comprehensive notions of the ‘Cook’ and the ‘Teacher’ could be based. Similarly in regard to the four kinds of Negation,—Prior Negation and the like,—how could there be any such comprehensive notion as ‘Negation’? Certainly there could be no ‘Universal’ in this case,—as this must rest in positive entities.—Similarly in regard to persons and things created by imagination,—such as the poetical character of Candrāpīḍa (in Kādambarī) and White Palaces in the sky and so forth,—and also in regard to persons dead and unborn—such as Mahāsammata, Śaṅkha and the rest,—how could there be any notion without there being any comprehensive character? Surely there is no ‘Universal’ in these cases; which are all based upon individuals.—(748-749)