आगमे विश्वासटिप्पन्यः

Original

अन्यधर्मनिमित्तश्चेत्तत्राप्यस्त्यस्तितामतिः ।
तदन्यधर्महेतुत्वेऽनिष्ठासक्तेरधर्मिता ॥ ७४५ ॥
व्यभिचारी ततो हेतुरमीभिरयमिष्यते ।
नच सर्वोपसंहाराद्व्याप्तिरस्य प्रसाधिता ॥ ७४६ ॥

anyadharmanimittaścettatrāpyastyastitāmatiḥ |
tadanyadharmahetutve’niṣṭhāsakteradharmitā || 745 ||
vyabhicārī tato heturamībhirayamiṣyate |
naca sarvopasaṃhārādvyāptirasya prasādhitā || 746 ||

If in regard to the categories mentioned, the notion that ‘it exists’ is due to something else,—then, in regard to this ‘something’ also the notion that£ it exists’ is present; and so on and on, there would be an infinite regress,—and the character of ‘having the property’ would cease. in view of these, the reason would become ‘fallible’ (untrue).—then again the all-embracing concomitance of the reason has not yet been established.—(745-746)

Kamalaśīla

The following argument may be put forward “Even in the Categories named, the property of ‘existence’ is present in the form of being the object of the right Cognition that ‘it exists’; so that here also the name is due to something other than the object itself; and hence the Reason is not untrue”, The answer to this is provided in the following—[see verses 745-746 above]

Even if it be admitted that the notions in question are due to something else, the defect of ‘Fallibility’ remains; because even in regard to the property mentioned by the Opponent, there is the notion that ‘it exists’, which is expressed by the words ‘this property of existence is there’;—so this notion of is-ness will have to be attributed to something other than ‘Existence’ (or Being); and so on and on, there would be an infinite regress; as also the anomaly that other things also would be receptacles of the Property, and hence ‘things possessing that property’; and the result thus would be that there would be no such restriction of number as that ‘there are only six Categories’ which can have properties.—If in order to avoid the Infinite

Regress, a further property (of is-ness) is not postulated, then, in view of these notions,—as appearing in connection with the Categories, or with the property of Existence,—the Reason -would have to be regarded as ‘fallible’ (untrue).

It may be that the ‘inconclusiveness’ of the Reason is not due to its being Too Wide; even so, how could the defect of its negation being open to ‘doubt’ be avoided?—This is what is pointed out in the words—‘Then again, etc. etc.’;—what is meant by ‘all-embracing concomitance’ is the cognition of the fact of the Reason being invariably concomitant with the whole of the thing in which the Probandum is sought to be proved.

The following argument might be urged “The required concomitance is there all right; because, if there were no other Cause, how could the notion in question (of the Universal ‘Cow’, etc.) be different from the notion of the thing itself? There can be no difference among notions of the same object, even when they are many. If there were such difference, then, there could he no diversity even among the notions of different things, like Colour, Taste and so forth; because diversity among things is always due to the diversity among Cognitions.”

This is not right; as a matter of fact, there can be no idea of ‘Universal’ in regard to the ‘Specific Peculiarity’ of things. Because the ‘Specific Peculiarity’ never forms the object of any notion associated with verbal expression.—But,—even in the absence of any ‘Universal’,—if the view be held that each thing by itself is one only and is excluded, from other things, on some basis,—and it is through this basis that there come about various assumptions and verbal expressions of an all-embracing character, in accordance with conventions and the experience of people;—if such were the view, then there would be no opposition to it. This is the reason why the Text speaks of the ‘absence of concomitance—(745-746)