Original
परस्परविभिन्ना हि यथा बुद्धिसुखादयः ।
पृथग्वाच्यास्तदङ्गं च विनाऽन्येन तथाऽपरे ॥ ६५२ ॥parasparavibhinnā hi yathā buddhisukhādayaḥ |
pṛthagvācyāstadaṅgaṃ ca vinā’nyena tathā’pare || 652 ||Just as cognition, pleasure and the rest, being different from one another, are spoken of as ‘separate’, and hence become the basis of that notion (of separateness), independently of anything else,—so would other things also.—(652)
Kamalaśīla
In Pleasure and other Qualities, the Quality of ‘separateness’ cannot subsist; because Qualities are devoid of Qualities (under the Opponent’s doctrine); and yet they are spoken of as ‘separate’, in the sense that they are mutually exclusive; and as such they become the ‘basis’—cause—of that notion of ‘being separate’. In the same manner-, the Jar and other things also, which have been regarded as ‘substance’, should be devoid of any such quality as ‘Separateness’, distinct from themselves.—Nor can the said notion be said to be ‘figurative’; as it does not differ in any way from the ‘direct’ notion.—Such is the sense of the Text.
Or, the Text may be taken as showing the notion of ‘being separate’ to be not based upon anything apart from thengs concerned, and thereby points out the annulment of the Opponent’s Conclusion by Inference.—This Inference may be formulated as follows:—Things that are mutually exclusive are not the substrata of any such quality as ‘separateness’, apart from themselves,—like Pleasure, etc.,—Jar and otherngs are mutually exclusive;—hence this is a natural Reason (for believing that the Jar, etc. cannot be the substratum of any such quality as ‘Separateness’).
It is impossible for any oneng to subsist in many things. As for Subsistence (which the Naiyāyika postulates as subsisting in many things), it is going to be rejected later on; and hence there can be no such relation as ‘Subsistence’, An argument annulling the said notion is also available in the shape of the possibility of such relation being not present in Pleasure and the rest.—(652)