0489 Verse 639-640

Original

इच्छारचितसङ्केतमनस्कारान्वयं त्विदम् ।
घटेष्वेकादिविज्ञानं ज्ञानादाविव वर्तते ॥ ६३९ ॥
अद्रव्यत्वान्न सङ्ख्याऽस्ति तेषु काचिद्विभेदिनी ।
तज्ज्ञानं नैव युक्तं तु भाक्तमस्खलितत्वतः ॥ ६४० ॥

icchāracitasaṅketamanaskārānvayaṃ tvidam |
ghaṭeṣvekādivijñānaṃ jñānādāviva vartate || 639 ||
adravyatvānna saṅkhyā’sti teṣu kācidvibhedinī |
tajjñānaṃ naiva yuktaṃ tu bhāktamaskhalitatvataḥ || 640 ||

As in cognition, so in things like the jar also, the notion of ‘one’ and the rest is one that follows only from an imaginary convention set up by a mere whim.—there can be no differentiating number in these (cognitions), because they are not ‘substance—nor can the notion be said to be ‘figurative’, as it is not found to be fallible.—(639-640)

Kamalaśīla

The following Texts show that the existence of ‘Number’ is not proved by the Cognition of specific individualities:—[see verses 639-640 above]

There are such notions as ‘one cognition’, ‘two cognitions’ and so forth,—in which the notions of one, two, etc., appear even though there are no such Numbers actually present (in the Cognitions);—in the same manner, in the case of a Jar also when it is not accompanied by anything else, there is the notion of its being ‘one’; and this must have its source in the imaginary convention that has been set up by people. Consequently the argument based upon such notions cannot be conclusive.

That in Cognitions, no Number exists follows from the fact that Cognitions are not Substance, while Number is a Quality and as such must subsist in a Substance.

It might be argued that “in the case of Cognition, the sai d notion may be regarded as figurative,—the sense being that ‘Cognition is as if it were one’,—and the absence of companion may be taken as the similarity on which the figurative expression is based

The answer to this is as follows:—‘Nor can the notion, etc., etc.’;—that is, the notion in question cannot be rightly held to be figurative; as it is not found to be fallible. Such figurative expressions as ‘the Ploughman is an ox’ mean that ‘the man is as if it were an ox’, and not that he is ‘an ox itself’—as he does not have the dewlap and other distinguishing features of the ox;—there is no such failure (negation) in the case in question,—the notion being that ‘the cognition is one’, not that ‘it is as if it were one’; as a matter of fact, the notion in regard to the Cognitions is just as infallible as that in regard to the Jar and such things.—(639-640)