आगमे विश्वासटिप्पन्यः

Original

षडेते धर्मिणः प्रोक्ता धर्मास्तेभ्योऽतिरेकिणः ।
इष्टा एवेति चेत्कोऽयं संबन्धस्तस्य तैर्मतः ॥ ५७४ ॥
द्रव्येषु नियमाद्युक्ता न संयोगो न चापरः ।
समवायोस्ति नान्यश्च संबन्धोऽङ्गीकृतः परैः ॥ ५७५ ॥

ṣaḍete dharmiṇaḥ proktā dharmāstebhyo’tirekiṇaḥ |
iṣṭā eveti cetko’yaṃ saṃbandhastasya tairmataḥ || 574 ||
dravyeṣu niyamādyuktā na saṃyogo na cāparaḥ |
samavāyosti nānyaśca saṃbandho’ṅgīkṛtaḥ paraiḥ || 575 ||

“The six that have been postulated are things with properties, and the properties are certainly admitted by us to be distinct from them.”—If this is said (by the other party), then (we ask)—what is the relation that is held to subsist between the categories and the properties? This relation cannot be that of ‘conjunction’, as this is restricted to substances alone (under the nyāya-view); nor is the other relation, that of ‘inherence’, possible; and no other relation is accepted by the other party.—(574-575)

Kamalaśīla

Says the other party—“This is what we readily admit; hence it does not vitiate our argument.”

How is it then that you have declared the Categories to be six only?

The answer to this question is anticipated and answered in the following—[see verse 574-575 above]

“The ‘Six Categories’ that have been postulated are only those that have Properties; while the ‘Six Categories’ in the shape of the Properties are held to be quite distinct; as is found in the following words of the Padārthapraveśaka—‘This mention has been made of only the things with properties, without any mention of the Properties’.”

The answer to this explanation of the other party is provided by the words—‘Then what is the relation, etc., etc.’;—Relation—of the Property in the shape of Existence, etc.—with ‘those’—i.e. the Categories what is that relation by virtue of which Existence becomes the ‘property’ of the Categories? Without some sort of relation the character of ‘Property and With Properly’ would not be possible; otherwise it would lead to the absurdity of everything being the Property of everything. As a matter of fact, there is no relation between the Property of Existence and the Categories. Because there are only two kinds of Relation—Conjunction and Inherence. The relation of Conjunction is not possible in the case in question, because being of the nature of Quality, Conjunction is restricted to Substances only [and Substance is only one of the Six Categories; all these latter, therefore, cannot have Conjunction with the Property of Existence].—Nor can the relation be one of the nature of Inherence, because it is held to be one only, like ‘Existence’ itself; while if the relation of ‘Inherence’ subsisted between Inherence and the Categories, then the former ‘Inherence’ should have to be regarded as different from the latter [and this would involve self-contradiction].—(574-575)