Original
नित्यत्वे सकलाः स्थूला जायेरन्सकृदेव हि ।
संयोगादि न चापेक्ष्यं तेषामस्त्यविशेषतः ॥ ५५२ ॥nityatve sakalāḥ sthūlā jāyeransakṛdeva hi |
saṃyogādi na cāpekṣyaṃ teṣāmastyaviśeṣataḥ || 552 ||If atoms were permanent, then all gross substances would be produced at once; as they are equally independent of conjunction and other conditions.—(552)
Kamalaśīla
The following Text states a counter-argument in annulment of the permanence of Atoms:—[see verse 552 above]
If Atoms, which are the cause of all gross things, like the Mountain and so forth, are held to be permanent,—then their Products, in the shape of all gross things, should be produced simultaneously, as their cause would be always there in its perfect condition. This argument may be formulated thus:—All those things whose causes are present in their perfect and unobstructed form must be produced at once,—like many Seeds, when their causes are present in their perfect and unobstructed forms;—all gross things are held to have permanent Atoms for their cause;—so this must be a natural reason (for regarding them as liable to be produced all at once). If things were not to be produced even in the presence of their causes in the complete form,—then they might never be produced at all, there being nothing to distinguish one case from the other; this would be a counter-argument in annulment of the Nyāya doctrine.
The following argument might be put forward by the other party:—“The Cause is held to be of three kinds—(1) the Inherent (Constituent) Cause, (2) the Non-inherent Cause, and (3) the Efficient Cause;—when one thing inheres (subsists) in another, it is its Inherent Cause; that which acts as the Cause without inhering in a thing is its Non-inherent Cause; e.g. the conjunction of the component parts is such a Cause of the composite object;—all the other kinds of Cause are included under the third kind, the Efficient Cause. Such are the various kinds of Cause that go to produce a thing. All these necessary causal conditions in the form of Conjunction and the rest cannot always be present; and the presence of the complete Cause cannot be admitted at all times. So that the Reason put forward in the above argument of the Buddhist cannot be admitted.”
In answer to this, the Author has added—‘They are equally independent of Conjunction and other conditions’;—if Conjunction and the other conditions produced a certain peculiarity in the Atoms, then these latter would be dependent upon those conditions; as it is however, the Atoms, being permanent, cannot have any peculiarity produced in them by anything else; under the circumstances, how could they be dependent upon Conjunction and other conditions?
As a matter of fact however all such gross things as the Body, the House and the like do not appear at one and the same time;—in fact, they are found to be produced one after the other. Hence the conclusion must be contrary to the one propounded by the Naiyāyika. This argument may be formulated as follows:—The causes that produce things successively must be impermanent,—e.g. the Seeds which produce the Sprouts successively;—the Atoms also are productive of Effects in succession; hence this is a natural reason (for regarding Atoms as impermanent).—(552)