0404 Verse 527

Original

दृश्यत्वाभिमतं नैवं वयं चोपलभामहे ।
तत्कथं तस्य सम्बन्धमङ्गीकुर्मो निबन्धनम् ॥ ५२७ ॥

dṛśyatvābhimataṃ naivaṃ vayaṃ copalabhāmahe |
tatkathaṃ tasya sambandhamaṅgīkurmo nibandhanam || 527 ||

Though it has been regarded as perceptible, yet we do not perceive it; how then can we accept the connection op that as the basis (op the causal character)?—(527)

Kamalaśīla

‘Operation’ has been held by you to be something perceptible; as asserted by Kumārila (Ślokavārtika: Śabdanityatā—433)—‘When the Operation of a Thing is perceived before the Effect, thatng is regarded as the Cause of that Effect, etc. etc.’—And further, that particular entity which is of the nature of the ‘Operation’—is it something different from the Thing to which it belongs? Or is it non-different from it?—In the case of all entities, no third alternative is possible; and no such alternatives are possible as ‘it is both different and non-different’, or that ‘it is neither different nor non-different’.

If then, it is something different, then the Thing itself cannot be the ‘Cause’, as the ‘causal character’ belongs to the Operation which is someng different from the Thing.—It might be argued that “by virtue of its connection with the Operation, the Thing also would have the causal character”.—That however is not possible; because there can be no connection betweenngs which do not help one another.—It might be answered that “the Operation is helped by the Thing”.—That also is not right; as a matter of fact, the Thing has no other Operation by which it could help the previous Operation; if it were otherwise, then there would be an infinite regress (of Operations), whereby the successive Operations themselves would accomplish each other, and there would be no connection between the Operation and the Thing.—If it be assumed that the Thing helps the Operation, without any further Operation,—then, why should not the Thing by its mere existence, without any Operation, help the Effect (to come into existence),—for which purpose a different thing in the shape of the Operation is assumed? In fact, there is nothing to prevent its usefulness towards the Effect, by its mere existence. From all this it follows that it is not right to assume a distinct thing in the shape of the ‘Operation

If then the other alternative be accepted—that the ‘Operation’ is non-different from the ‘Thing’ (to which it belongs),—then it becomes admitted that ‘existence’ is the only Operation; because the term ‘existence’ connotes only the nature of theng concerned.

Thus the view that the ‘Operation’ (of the Cause) is something different from its own coming into existence—cannot be accepted.—(527)

Further, in the case of Cognition, it is found that as soon as it appears in the form of the apprehension of its object,—it operates by its mere existence; and hence in the case of all Things, the causal character must belong to themselves, without any subsequent operation.—

This is what is explained in the following—[see verse 528 next]