Original
न ह्यलब्धात्मकं वस्तु पराङ्गत्वाय कल्पते ।
न विनष्टं नच स्थानं तस्य कार्यकृतिक्षमम् ॥ ४८३ ॥
पूर्वक्षणविनाशे च कल्प्यमाने निरन्वये ।
पश्चात्तस्यानिमित्तत्वादुत्पत्तिर्नोपपद्यते ॥ ४८४ ॥na hyalabdhātmakaṃ vastu parāṅgatvāya kalpate |
na vinaṣṭaṃ naca sthānaṃ tasya kāryakṛtikṣamam || 483 ||
pūrvakṣaṇavināśe ca kalpyamāne niranvaye |
paścāttasyānimittatvādutpattirnopapadyate || 484 ||“An entity that has itself not secured its existence can never re the cause of something else; nor can the destroyed entity (be a cause); nor can the presence (of the present entity) be capable of producing the effect.—Further, if the destruction of the previous ‘moment’ be held to be absolute, then there could be no production of any subsequent ‘moment’, as its cause would not be there.”—(483-484)
Kamalaśīla
The following Text adduces arguments in support of each of the assertions made in the preceding Text regarding the Future, etc.:—[see verses 483-484 above]
Thatng is called ‘future’ which has not yet secured its existence;—what has not secured its existence must be ‘non-existent’; what is nonexistent must be devoid of all potentiality;—what is devoid of all potentiality cannot serve as the cause of anything else,—i.e. cannot serve as the cause of bringing about any otherng; because it is agreed on all sides that it is only a potential thing that can serve as a cause.
Similarly what has perished cannot serve as the cause of anything else, as it is devoid of all potentiality.
As for the Present thing, that has no continued existence, by virtue of which it could be capable of producing any effect.
Then again, if it is held that the preceding ‘Moment’ perishes absolutely, then there could be no producing of the subsequent ‘Moment’, as there would be no cause for such production.—(483-484)