0345 Verse 449-450

Original

नचैवं तेन नैवेदं तदर्थग्राहकं मतम् ।
तज्ज्ञानकाल उत्पादाद्विषयान्तरबुद्धिवत् ॥ ४४९ ॥
अभेदाध्यवसायेन भिन्नरूपेऽपि वृत्तितः ।
मायागोलकविज्ञानमिव भ्रान्तमिदं स्थितम् ॥ ४५० ॥

nacaivaṃ tena naivedaṃ tadarthagrāhakaṃ matam |
tajjñānakāla utpādādviṣayāntarabuddhivat || 449 ||
abhedādhyavasāyena bhinnarūpe’pi vṛttitaḥ |
māyāgolakavijñānamiva bhrāntamidaṃ sthitam || 450 ||

As a matter of fact, however it is not so; then the recognition has not been regarded as apprehending the same object;—because it is produced at its own time,—like the cognition of another thing; and inasmuch as it apprehends as non-different what is really different, it must be mistaken,—like the notion of the illusory ball.—(449-450)

Kamalaśīla

The following Text puts forward reasonings in the indirect form of a reductio ad absurdum:—[see verses 449-450 above]

The arguments may be thus formulated;—(a) When a cognition does not appear even when the thing is there in its perfect form, that Cognition cannot have that thing for its object;—e.g. even when Colour is there in its perfectly perceptible form, the auditory perception is not there;—even when the Diamond and other things were there in the perfectly perceptible form at the time of their previous perception, their Recognition does not appear at that time; hence the wider condition not being present (the less wide condition cannot be there).—(b) Thus if the Diamond and other things were permanent, the Recognition of those things should appear on the previous occasion, when its causes would be present in its perfect form;—and yet as a matter of fact, it does not appear at that time;—hence it becomes established that those things cannot be permanent. Thus then, it remains undisputed that since it apprehends as non-different what is different, the Recognition must be mistaken, like the cognition of the illusory Ball. Thus it has been shown that Recognition is not one that has its object not denied;—[hence it is invalid]; because its object is actually annulled by the aforesaid reasoning which has proved it to be wrong.—(449-450)