आगमे विश्वासटिप्पन्यः

Original

ननु च प्रत्यभिज्ञानं स एवेत्युपजायते ।
अक्षव्यापारसद्भावे निष्प्रकम्पबाधितम् ॥ ४४४ ॥
ततः प्रत्यक्षबाधेयं दुर्वारा सर्वहेतुषु ।
क्षणभङ्गप्रसिद्ध्यर्थमुपात्तेषु प्रसज्यते ॥ ४४५ ॥

nanu ca pratyabhijñānaṃ sa evetyupajāyate |
akṣavyāpārasadbhāve niṣprakampabādhitam || 444 ||
tataḥ pratyakṣabādheyaṃ durvārā sarvahetuṣu |
kṣaṇabhaṅgaprasiddhyarthamupātteṣu prasajyate || 445 ||

“As a matter of fact, there is always the recognition of a thing in the form ‘this is that same’, when the sense-organ concerned is rightly functioning; and this recognition is quite firm and undeniable.—This therefore is an irrepressible fact of perception, which annuls all the reasons that have been adduced for proving the ‘perpetual flux’ of things.”—(444-445)

Kamalaśīla

In the following Texts, the author sets forth arguments against the doctrine of the ‘Perpetual Flux’, from the standpoint of the followers of Jaimini and others:—[see verses 444-445 above]

“For instance, in regard to Mountains, the Body, the Diamond and such things,—after the proper functioning of the sense-organ concerned, there appears the valid sense-perception called ‘Recognition’,—in the form of ‘this is that same’,—which rejects the idea ofngs being ‘momentary’, Even though it is true that such Recognition is found to appear also in regard to newly grown nails, hairs, grasses, and such things,—yet the Recognition regarding the Diamond and such things cannot be invalid,—as it is never annulled. This is what is meant by the epithets ‘firm and undeniable’, What is meant is that the mere fact that the Recognition in the case of Hair-brought about by the Eyes affected by darkness,—is invalid cannot lead men with unclouded minds to regard as invalid the direct visual perception of the real Hair, brought about by undimmed Eyes.—The epithet ‘firm’ implies the fact of its not being of doubtful character,—there being no such doubt as to whether this is really the same or something else. The epithet ‘undeniable’ implies the fact of its not being wrong”—(444-445)

The Author answers these arguments in the following—[see verses 446-447 next]